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ARTICLES
THE SUPREME COURT'S AVOIDANCE OF THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE IN CLINTON V.
CITY OF NEW YORK: MORE THAN "A DIME'S
WORTH OF DIFFERENCE"
Steven F. Huefner*
The D.C. Circuit's recent decision in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.
EPAI which invalidated certain Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) national ambient air quality standards,' is but the latest of several
prominent cases over recent decades to provide courts an opportunity to
revive the nondelegation doctrine Judicial consideration of something
akin to the nondelegation doctrine, which in its original form professed
to prohibit Congress from delegating its legislative powers to the execu-
tive branch,4 traces at least to 1813. The Supreme Court, however, has
used the doctrine to strike down statutory delegations as unconstitutional
only twice, both times in 1935.' In the ensuing six decades, the doctrine
has come to be seen as "moribund" as a tool for enforcing a proper sepa-
ration of legislative and executive power,7 and to function only as a tool
*Assistant Senate Legal Counsel, United States Senate. J.D., 1991, Columbia University;
A.B., 1986, Harvard University. The author represented the United States Senate, amicus
curiae, in supporting the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act. The views expressed
herein are solely the author's and do not represent the views of the United States Senate.
For generous comments and encouragement, the author thanks Chris Bryant, Mike Da-
vidson, Anuj Desai, Stacey Dogan, Christine Durham, Morgan Frankel, Kent Greenfield,
Tom Griffith, Christian Johnson, Maria Simon, and David Tatel.
1. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), petitions for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W.
3570 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2000) (Nos. 99-1257, 99-1263, & 99-1265).
2. See id. at 1033-34, 1057.
3. See infra Part II.D.
4. See Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 1119, 1127 (1977). A variant of the doctrine that is beyond the scope of
this Article also prohibits delegating legislative authority to the private sector. See Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316-17 (1936).
5. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.D.
7. Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the result); see also Consumer Energy Council of Am. v.
FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 448 n.82 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[The nondelegation doctrine] has often
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of statutory construction, according to which courts interpret statutory
delegations of authority narrowly to avoid constitutional problems.'
In this latter role of limiting the construction that agencies may place
upon their authority, the doctrine still possesses great power, as dramati-
cally evidenced in American Trucking.9 But this widely reported and
controversial decision,' ° in which the D.C. Circuit remanded the EPA's
national ambient air quality standards with instructions that the agency
narrow its construction of the Clean Air Act," also raises the question
whether the nondelegation doctrine may soon reclaim a yet larger role.
As the dissent in American Trucking described, the decision "threatens
to strike down section 109 of the [Clean Air] Act as an unconstitutional
delegation of congressional authority unless" on remand the EPA can
sufficiently circumscribe its delegated authority. 2
For several decades, a variety of legal scholars and judges have been
urging or contemplating just such a revival of the nondelegation doctrine.
Over twenty years ago, Judge McGowan of the D.C. Circuit declared
(with perhaps a hint of frustration) that lawyers have grown reluctant
even to raise the nondelegation doctrine as a constitutional challenge to
a statute. 3 Nevertheless, he queried whether the Supreme Court might
again embrace the doctrine "when the issue is raised in the right case.'
4
In this regard, American Trucking has sent shock waves of both hope and
alarm throughout the legal community.
Yet if ever there was a "right case" to fulfill the aspirations of those
seeking a reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine, it was not Ameri-
been declared deceased.").
8. See National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 US. 336, 341-42
(1974); International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see
also 1 KENNETH GULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 2.6, at 72-73 (3d ed. 1994). For earlier examples, see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 128-30 (1958), and Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 149 (1889).
9. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
10. See A Reach on Regulation, WASH. POST, May 19, 1999, at A22; Bad Decision on
Clean Air, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at A22; Clean Air Gets Murky, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
May 31, 1999, at A10; John J. Fialka, EPA Plans to Appeal Air-Quality Ruling, WALL ST.
J., May 17, 1999, at B2; John J. Fialka, Professor Seeks to Limit Congress Ability to Dele-
gate Tasks to Federal Agencies, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1999, at B12; Randolph J. May, D.C.
Circuit Decision Draws Needed Spotlight to Nondelegation Doctrine, LEGAL TIMES, June
21, 1999, at 20; Joby Warrick & Bill McAllister, New Air Pollution Limits Blocked, WASH.
POST, May 15, 1999, at Al.
11. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033-40.
12. Id. at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
13. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1128.
14. Id. at 1130.
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can Trucking. Rather, it was Clinton v. City of New York, 5 in which the
Supreme Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, which had
given the President the authority to cancel. certain items of federal
spending. 16 Despite the fact that this Act was ripe for invalidation under
the nondelegation doctrine as an abdication of congressional responsi-
bility, the Court explicitly eschewed the opportunity to do so, and instead
invalidated the Line Item Veto Act for noncompliance with the law-
making requirements of the Constitution's Presentment Clause, 7 as most
of the Act's detractors had urged." This Clause requires that both
Houses of Congress and the President agree on the precise text of each
statute (unless Congress enacts the statute over a presidential veto).
Although the Presentment Clause analysis of the Line Item Veto Act
has superficial appeal, it ultimately does not withstand scrutiny. This Ar-
ticle argues that the nondelegation doctrine provided a superior basis for
invalidating the Line Item Veto Act, despite the fact that many of the
Act's supporters had relied heavily upon the nondelegation doctrine to
defend the Act. The Act's defenders were hoping that the Court's per-
15. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
16. See id. at 421, 436.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see 524 U.S. at 448.
18. See, e.g., Senator Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto
Act, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 320-21 (1998) (arguing that the "Act violates the clear
language of the Presentment Clause" by permitting unilateral repeals); Michael J. Ger-
hardt, The Bottom Line on the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
233, 233, 237-40 (1997) (arguing that the Act is unconstitutional under Article I, and sug-
gesting that the nondelegation doctrine test is the proper standard only when Congress
delegates "to administrative agencies or inferior bodies"); H. Jefferson Powell & Jed
Rubenfeld, Laying It on the Line: A Dialogue on Line Item Vetoes and Separation of Pow-
ers, 47 DUKE L.J. 1171, 1172 (1998) (acknowledging that to most observers, the Act ap-
pears to violate the Presentment Clause); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Future of the Item
Veto, 83 IOWA L. REV. 79, 104-18 (1997) (arguing that the Act is invalid under Article I
for the same reasons as a statutory attempt to give -the President true item veto power
would be invalid); The Committee on Federal Legislation, Revisiting the Line-Item Veto,
50 REC. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 321, 325-29 (1995) (arguing that the line-item veto violates
bicameral and presentment requirements); infra notes 351-354 and accompanying text
(describing the Presentment Clause challenges made in City of New York v. Clinton). But
see Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1659,
1660-63 (1997) (arguing that the Line Item Veto Act "pushes delegation too far" and will
be found unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine); Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Note, Is
a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J. 838, 845-52 (1987) (arguing that
various proposed item vetoes are improper under the nondelegation doctrine).
For a lively and engaging analysis of the pros and cons of both the Article I and
nondelegation doctrine arguments against the Act, see Powell & Rubenfeld, supra, at
1172-96. Also see Catherine M. Lee, Note, The Constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act
of 1996: Three Potential Sources For Presidential Line Item Veto Power, 25 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 119, 136-48 (1997), for both nondelegation doctrine and Article I arguments
against the Act.
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missive construction of the doctrine since 1935 would create a safe har-
bor for the Act.19 Indeed, Justice Scalia partially vindicated this hope
when he proclaimed in his dissent that "there is not a dime's worth of dif-
ference" between the Act's grant of authority to the President to cancel
spending items and the long-accepted congressional practice of author-
izing expenditures of particular sums subject to the President's discre-
tion."° This Article concludes, however, that there was more than a
dime's worth of difference between the Line Item Veto Act and the
myriad of previously accepted delegations, and that the Court therefore
should have struck down the Act under a limited application of the non-
delegation doctrine, rather than under the Presentment Clause. While
the Supreme Court need not and should not have announced any whole-
sale reinvigoration of the doctrine, thereby threatening the basis for the
modern administrative state, it should have employed a narrow applica-
tion of the doctrine to invalidate the Act.
The Supreme Court's refusal to embrace any version of the nondelega-
tion doctrine to strike down the Line Item Veto Act, and its decision in-
stead to use the Presentment Clause to develop what ultimately is an un-
satisfying basis for invalidating the Act, has several implications.
Principally, the Court's failure to seize this opportunity suggests that this
Court remains unprepared to disturb the currently moribund construc-
tion of the nondelegation doctrine. In addition, by bypassing the non-
delegation doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York, the Court demon-
strated its occasional willingness to use alternative rationales to
accomplish the same result as would a more robust nondelegation doc-
trine rationale. Indeed, the Court's decision to employ an alternative,
Presentment Clause rationale to invalidate the Line Item Veto Act may
ultimately be more significant than the actual result it reached, because
in theory this same rationale could threaten a variety of heretofore ac-
cepted delegations to the executive.
This Article explores the status of the nondelegation doctrine in light
19. See, e.g., Gordon T. Butler, The Line Item Veto and the Tax Legislative Process: A
Futile Effort at Deficit Reduction, But a Step Toward Tax Integrity, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 43-
52 (1997) (arguing that the Act's grant of authority to the President to cancel limited tax
benefits does not violate either Article I or the nondelegation doctrine); Powell & Ruben-
feld, supra note 18, at 1188-98 (analyzing and rejecting the nondelegation doctrine argu-
ments, as well as the Presentment Clause arguments, against the Act); Michael G. Locklar,
Comment, Is the 1996 Line-Item Veto Constitutional?, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1161, 1187 (1997)
(arguing that the Act is constitutional and does not violate the nondelegation doctrine);
see also infra text accompanying notes 376-82 (describing the nondelegation doctrine de-
fense made by the proponents of the Act in Clinton v. City of New York).
20. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,466 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the Court's approach to the line item veto in Clinton v. City of New
York.21 Part I presents a history of the nondelegation doctrine. Part II
discusses suggestions that the Court rejuvenate the doctrine, coupled
with a review of the most recent nondelegation cases. Part III then de-
scribes the Line Item Veto Act, its potential vulnerability to a nondelega-
tion doctrine challenge, and the nondelegation arguments made against
the Act in the Supreme Court by parties and amici. How and why the
Supreme Court left this potential untapped, by embracing an unsatisfac-
tory Presentment Clause rationale, is the focus of Part IV. Part V con-
cludes that although the decision in Clinton v. City of New York may op-
erate as an alternative constraint upon permissible delegations, the irony
of the decision is that it has left the nondelegation doctrine at least as
impotent as before. In fact, where Congress' spending authority is con-
cerned, the Court may be willing to condone some delegations even
more permissively, notwithstanding its refusal to uphold the Line Item
Veto Act. In any event, the Supreme Court's avoidance of the nondele-
gation doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York is telling, for if the Court
does desire to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine, it will be hard
pressed to find a better opportunity than the Line Item Veto Act pre-
sented.
I. A HISTORY OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
The doctrine of nondelegation of legislative authority is merely one
manifestation of the constitutional separation of powers. Quoting Mon-
tesquieu, James Madison wrote in Federalist 47: "'When the legislative
21. For other journal articles which analyze or describe the Supreme Court's invali-
dation of the Line Item Veto Act, see Leon Friedman, Line Item Veto and Separation of
Powers, 15 ToURo L. REV. 983, 983 (1999), reflecting upon the Court's separation-of-
powers jurisprudence and summarizing the Line Item Veto Act litigation; Elizabeth
Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto
Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 873 (1999), arguing that the Court misapplied the Pre-
sentment Clause in its analysis and should have upheld the Act under the nondelegation
doctrine; Lars Noah, The Executive Line Item Veto and the Judicial Power to Sever: What's
the Difference?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 235, 236, 246 (1999), criticizing the Court's Pre-
sentment Clause analysis by comparing the Act's cancellation authority with the judici-
ary's power to sever statutory provisions; Roy E. Brownell II, Comment, The Unnecessary
Demise of the Line Item Veto Act: The Clinton Administration's Costly Failure to Seek Ac-
knowledgment of "National Security Rescission", 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1273 (1998), arguing
that the Act was much less likely to have been invalidated if the President had restricted
cancellations to provisions implicating national security; and Courtney Worcester, Note,
An Abdication of Responsibility and a Violation of a Finely Wrought Procedure: The Su-
preme Court Vetoes the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1583, 1606-08 (1998),
criticizing the Court's conclusion that the Act violated the Presentment Clause, and sug-
gesting that the Act did not violate principles of separation of powers.
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and executive powers are united in the same person or body,... there
can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same mon-
arch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyranni-
cal manner.' ' 22 Thus, the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to re-
strain Congress from voluntarily surrendering to the executive branch
those lawmaking powers that the framers deliberately reposed out of the
executive's reach.
Perhaps the classic judicial statement of the nondelegation doctrine
remains the Supreme Court's 1892 pronouncement in Field v. Clark:
That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the Presi-
dent is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution ....
"The true distinction ... is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.,,23
Nevertheless, this "true distinction" is at one level merely a tautology,
requiring a consideration of what constitutes a nondelegable "lawmak-
ing" power, and whether Congress has bestowed such a power on the ex-
ecutive branch.
A. Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Practice of "Contingent
Legislation"
Explicit Supreme Court examination of these questions traces at least
to the 1813 case of The Brig Aurora, in which the appellant argued that
"Congress could not transfer the legislative power to the President." 24 At
issue was an act providing for the revival of certain restrictions on im-
ports to the United States from either France or Great Britain, contin-
gent upon the President's certification that one of these countries had
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
John Locke similarly expressed that "[tihe legislative cannot transfer the power of making
laws to any other hands ... nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are en-
acted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them." JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 74-75 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
23. 143 U.S. 649, 692-94 (1892) (quoting Ohio Supreme Court Judge Ranney's opin-
ion in Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77,
88 (1852)).
24. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 386 (1813).
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not modified its edicts so as to "cease to violate the neutral commerce of
the United States."" The Court concluded that the legislature, not the
President, had revived the restrictions and had merely made the restric-
tions subject to a contingency that was up to the President to ascertain.26
Thus, Congress did not transfer any legislative power to the President.
Eight decades later, the Supreme Court developed this theme of "leg-
islating in contingency" at some length in Field v. Clark.27 There, the
Court upheld a delegation of authority to the President to suspend cer-
tain duty-free provisions of the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 if he deter-
mined that an importing country's tariffs were "reciprocally unequal."
'
The Court described with approval over a dozen examples of statutes
enacted during the previous hundred years that had authorized the
President to suspend or repeal import laws, or otherwise to regulate for-
eign commerce, upon satisfaction of congressionally specified condi-
tions.29
The most common contingency was a change in a foreign country's
trade regulations. For instance, in 1817, Congress prohibited foreign ves-
sels from importing plaster of Paris from any country that refused to
permit U.S. vessels to carry it, but allowed the President to discontinue
this prohibition with respect to any country that subsequently removed
its own restrictions. ° A similar, and even earlier, delegation of authority
was an 1815 act providing for the contingent repeal of certain import du-
ties, "[sluch repeal to take effect . . .whenever the President of the
United States shall be satisfied" that the exporting country's counter-
vailing duties have been abolished." A yet earlier and broader delega-
tion, but one still conditioned on a foreign country's specific behavior,
was Congress' 1798 grant of authority to the President "to remit and dis-
continue" certain commercial restrictions between the United States and
France, provided that the President determined that France had re-
frained from aggressions against U.S. vessels and had acknowledged the
United States' neutrality "in the present European war."32
25. Act of May 1, 1810, ch. 39, § 4, 2 Stat. 605, 606.
26. See The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at 388.
27. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
28. Id. at 692-93.
29. See id. at 683-92.
30. See Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 39, 3 Stat. 361, 361-62.
31. Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224; see also Act of May 31, 1830, ch. 219, 4
Stat. 425 (authorizing the President to suspend certain import duties contingent upon the
absence of the foreign nation's corresponding duties); Act of May 24, 1828, ch. 111, 4 Stat.
308 (same); Act of Jan. 7, 1824, ch. 4, § 4, 4 Stat. 3 (same).
32. Act of June 13, 1798, ch. 53, § 5, 1 Stat. 565, 566.
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Yet not all of the delegations described approvingly in Field v. Clark
depended upon a particular action of a foreign nation,33 and some delega-
tions permitted the President to take specific actions affecting foreign
commerce solely on his own judgment. For example, several months af-
ter the 1798 act, in its continuing response to the war in Europe, Con-
gress employed the almost unlimited contingency of authorizing the
President "to remit and discontinue" the prohibitions of an act further
suspending trade with France "if he shall deem it expedient and consis-
tent with the interest of the United States." 3 Similarly, in one of its ear-
liest delegations, Congress in 1794 authorized the President to embargo
vessels and ports "whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so re-
quire., 35 Congress, however, limited this embargo authority to periods
when Congress was not in session, and any embargo laid by the President
during such period automatically terminated fifteen days after Congress
reconvened.36 A decade later Congress empowered the President to ex-
tend by approximately six months a congressional suspension of certain
import prohibitions on goods from Great Britain "if in his judgment the
public interest should require it."37
Nevertheless, the subject matter of all of these delegations-U.S. im-
port restrictions-was plainly narrow, even if some of these delegations
may have given the President almost unfettered discretion to change
those restrictions. Furthermore, most of these delegations merely al-
lowed the President a binary choice between implementing or suspend-
ing some congressionally specified import restriction. One notable ex-
ception, however, was an 1884 statute that allowed the President to
modify the amount of import duties to be collected on vessels from cer-
tain foreign ports by adjusting rates so that they matched the duties being
imposed on U.S. vessels entering those ports.3
After observing this pedigree, the Supreme Court in Field v. Clark up-
held section 3 of the McKinley Tariff Act, which stated:
That with a view to secure the reciprocal trade with countries
producing the following articles, and for this purpose, on and af-
33. For instance, in 1866, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to sus-
pend the prohibition on the importation of "neat cattle" from any country if the Secretary
determined that the importation of such cattle would not introduce or spread disease
among domestic cattle. See Act of March 6, 1866, ch. 12, 14 Stat. 3, 3-4; see also Tariff Act
of 1890, ch. 1244, § 20, 26 Stat. 567, 616.
34. Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, § 4, 1 Stat. 613, 615.
35. Act of June 4,1794, ch. 41, §1, 1 Stat. 372,372.
36. See id. §§ 1-2.
37. Act of Dec. 19, 1806, ch. 1, § 3, 2 Stat. 411,411.
38. Act of June 26, 1884, ch. 121, § 14, 23 Stat. 53, 57.
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ter the first day of January eighteen hundred and ninety-two,
whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied that
the Government of any country producing and exporting [speci-
fied commodities], imposes duties or other exactions upon the
agricultural or other products of the United States, which in
view of the free introduction of such [specified commodities]
into the United States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal
and unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his
duty to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions
of this act relating to the free introduction of such [specified
commodities, produced by] such country, for such time as he
shall deem just."
The Court explained that "in the judgment of the legislative branch...
it is often desirable, if not essential for the protection of the interests of
our people ... to invest the President with large discretion in matters
arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce
with other nations."' The Court opined that the President, in exercising
his delegated authority under the Act, was merely enforcing the policy
established by Congress of permitting free imports of specified commodi-
ties only when United States goods received reciprocal treatment
abroad.4'
Two Justices dissented from this rationale, explaining that a statutory
provision allowing the President to reinstate import duties whenever "he
may deem [a foreign country's duties] to be reciprocally unequal and un-
reasonable," and "for such time as he shall deem just," effectively "ex-
tends to the executive the exercise of those discretionary powers which
the Constitution has vested in the law-making department., 42 The dis-
senters dismissed the many examples cited by the majority because those
examples did not involve the delegation of such sweeping authority as
did section 3 of The McKinley Tariff Act, nor had the Court had occa-
sion to review those earlier examples, with the one exception of The Brig
Aurora, which the dissenters viewed as an approval of a much narrower
delegation of wholly executive authority.43
Nevertheless, The Brig Aurora and Field v. Clark serve as judicial
bookends to almost a century of the practice of "legislating in contin-
39. McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612.
40. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,691 (1892).
41. See id. at 693.
42. Id. at 699-700 (Lamar, J., with Fuller, CJ., concurring in the result but dissenting
from the opinion).
43. See id. at 698-99 (Lamar, J., with Fuller, C.J., concurring in the result but dissent-
ing from the opinion).
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gency," by which Congress delegated to the executive branch the
authority to shape the actual contours of federal law, subject to the ex-
ecutive's determination of the occurrence of congressionally established
conditions. Although in the nineteenth century this contingent legisla-
tion, or "fact-finding" delegation, occurred almost exclusively in the area
of foreign trade, it found somewhat wider application with the rise of the
administrative state in the twentieth century, in conjunction with a sec-
ond form of congressional delegation, that of "interstitial rulemaking."
B. Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Practice of "Interstitial
Rulemaking"
The Supreme Court's approval of a second form of delegation, in addi-
tion to the practice of contingent legislation, can be traced at least to the
1825 case of Wayman v. Southard." There, the Court explicitly condoned
the practice of delegating interstitial rulemaking authority.45 At issue in
Wayman was legislation giving courts the power to regulate their pro-
ceedings and establish their own rules. The Supreme Court distinguished
between "those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by
the legislature itself,"' and lesser subjects, for which Congress could en-
act a general provision giving power "to those who are to act under such
general provisions to fill up the details, 47 about the organization and op-
eration of a coordinate branch of government. The fact that Congress
was thereby sharing a power that it could itself exercise, but had chosen
not to, was decidedly unimportant to the Court.48
Though by no means nonexistent, other contested delegations of inter-
stitial rulemaking authority remained comparatively rare during most of
the nineteenth century.49 Of course, with the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) and the advent of the administrative
agency in 1887, Congress unleashed a new era of delegation.5 Yet, not
44. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.).
45. See id. at 698-99.
46. Id. at 43.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 181 (1886) (holding that Secretary of the
Navy's regulations affecting the conduct of courts martial have the force of law); Ex Parte
Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 22 (1879) (same); Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3. How.) 9, 29 (1845)
(discussing the Treasury Secretary's authority to establish regulations to secure accurate
appraisals of value and quantity of imports); see also United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 291, 301-02 (1842) (describing the executive's power to establish, modify, and repeal
army regulations).
50. See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383; THEODORE
J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 128-31 (1969)
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until the early part of the twentieth century did the ICC begin to find its
delegated authority seriously called into question.51 Instead, for several
more years the principal delegation issues to reach the Supreme Court
concerned more traditional executive functions.
In one notable refinement upon the Supreme Court's general approval
of interstitial regulation, the Court in 1887 voided an order of the Secre-
tary of the Navy that a particular training vessel was not to be considered
"at sea," at least insofar as this order would affect its officers' entitlement
to compensation for sea service." The Court explained that the Navy
Secretary lacks authority to declare something shore duty that the statute
requires the Navy to treat as sea duty.53 The Court stated that the Secre-
tary only has authority to "establish regulations in execution of, or sup-
plementary to, but not in conflict with, the statutes defining his powers,"
and concluded that the "contrary has never been held by this court.
' '
1
4
A contrasting pair of cases near the end of the nineteenth century in-
volved the authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to prom-
ulgate regulations regarding the sale of oleomargarine, a violation of
which warranted criminal punishment. In 1892, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Eaton5 invalidated a criminal indictment for failure to
keep required records of oleomargarine sales, on the basis that, although
the Commissioner's record-keeping requirements were valid, insufficient
statutory authority existed to render noncompliance with them criminal."
In contrast, in In re Kollock57 five years later, the Court upheld the crimi-
nal conviction of a retail dealer for violating the Commissioner's regula-
tions regarding required labels and containers. The statute under which
these regulations were issued, unlike the statute at issue in Eaton, explic-
51. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern R.R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287
(1908) (rejecting the claim that there was an unconstitutional delegation of authority to
the ICC to promulgate safety standards); ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214-
15 (1912) (upholding, against an unlawful delegation claim, ICC authority to prescribe re-
porting and accounting requirements for common carriers); Intermountain Rate Cases,
234 U.S. 476, 486-89 (1914) (upholding ICC authority to exempt rail carriers from the op-
eration of the long- and short-haul clause of the Interstate Commerce Act); New York
Central Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932) (sustaining the ICC's dele-
gated authority to authorize control of one rail carrier by another if it is in the "public in-
terest").
52. United States v. Symonds, 120 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1887).
53. See id. at 49.
54. Id.
55. 144 U.S. 677 (1892).
56. See id. at 688.
57. 165 U.S. 526 (1897).
58. See id. at 533.
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itly criminalized failure to package and label oleomargarine in confor-
mance with the Commissioner's regulations. Furthermore, given the
statute's primary purpose of levying taxes, the Court concluded that:
the designation of the stamps, marks and brands is merely in the
discharge of an administrative function and falls within the nu-
merous instances of regulations needful to the operation of the
machinery of particular laws, authority to make which has al-
ways been recognized as within the competency of the legisla-
tive power to confer."
Here then was another classic statement of the principle that authority
to fill statutory gaps may lawfully be delegated.
C. Twentieth-Century Evolution of the Requirement that Congress
Establish the Policy
From 1825 to the early twentieth century, the theory of interstitial
rulemaking developed essentially independently of the legislating-in-
contingency principle, which was first introduced in 1813 in The Brig
Aurora and given full voice in 1892 in Field v. Clark." In 1904, in the
case of Buttfield v. Stranahan,z the Supreme Court began to tie these
theories together. At issue in Buttfield was the Treasury Secretary's in-
terstitial rulemaking authority, under section 3 of the Tea Inspection Act
of 1897, to "establish uniform standards of purity, quality, and fitness for
consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United States."63 In
approving this delegation of gap-filling authority, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly relied upon "the principle of Field v. Clark," on the basis that the
Tea Inspection Act gave the Secretary "the mere executive duty to effec-
tuate the legislative policy declared in the statute.
'
"
Although the Buttfield Court apparently relied on Field v. Clark be-
cause both cases dealt with administrative power over foreign com-
merce,65 the Court here nevertheless seems to have envisioned both the
contingent-legislation and interstitial-rulemaking strands of the nondele-
gation doctrine as serving a common purpose of ensuring that Congress
is setting the policy to guide the executive. 6 The Court explained that
59. See id. at 532.
60. Id. at 536.
61. See 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 382 (1892); 143 U.S. 649 (1891).
62. 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
63. Act of Mar. 2, 1897, ch. 358, § 3, 29 Stat. 604, 605.
64. Buttfield, 192 U.S. at 496.
65. See id.
66. A more result-oriented view is "[tihat the Court abandoned the 'named contin-
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the Tea Act:
does not, in any real sense, invest administrative officials with
the power of legislation. Congress legislated on the subject as
far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of
the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty
of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute.67
From this point on, the Supreme Court analyzed whether Congress
was unconstitutionally delegating its legislative power by determining
whether Congress had sufficiently declared the legislative policy behind
the delegation. For instance, in 1907 the Court upheld the Secretary of
War's authority, under section 18 of the River and Harbor Act of 1899,
68
to require bridge owners to make alterations in order to preserve unob-
structed navigation, under penalty of criminal punishment. 9 After a re-
statement of the law of nondelegation, in which the Court summarized
the four major precedents to date (The Brig Aurora, Wayman, Field v.
Clark, and Buttfield), the Court upheld the delegation in the River and
Harbor Act with the following explanation:
It has long been the policy of the Government to remove such
unreasonable obstructions to the free navigation of the water-
ways .... That such an object was of common interest and
within the competency of Congress, . . . everyone must admit
.... [Congress] stopped, however, with this declaration of a
general rule and imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty of
ascertaining what particular cases came within the rule pre-
scribed by Congress, as well as the duty of enforcing the rule in
such cases. In performing that duty the Secretary of War will
only execute the clearly expressed will of Congress, and will
not, in any true sense, exert legislative or judicial power.70
Neither important to nor apparent in this decision is whether the Court
viewed the River and Harbor Act's delegation primarily as an interstitial
authority to fill gaps by evaluating the navigational obstructions of "each
particular bridge," or rather as a contingent authority to ascertain the
existence of the congressionally-specified "unreasonable obstructions" to
gency' test in the first case in which its application would have required the Court to hold
a statute unconstitutional," and substituted the named contingency test for a test of
whether Congress set sufficient standards. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 8, § 2.6, at 70.
67. Buttfield, 192 U.S. at 496.
68. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 18, 30 Stat. 1121, 1153-54.
69. See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 387-88 (1907); see also
Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 192-94 (1910) (reiterating the
same conclusion as Union Bridge).
70. Union Bridge, 204 U.S. at 385-86.
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navigation.71 Elements of both strands of these doctrines arguably can be
found at work here.72
Using the test of whether Congress had sufficiently articulated its leg-
islative policy, the Supreme Court upheld broader and broader delega-
tions as the twentieth century progressed, delegations that did not always
lend themselves to easy description as either narrow interstitial rule-
making or mere contingent legislation. For instance, in United States v.
Grimaud,7 the Court upheld a criminal prosecution for a violation of the
Secretary of Agriculture's regulations controlling sheep grazing on forest
reserves.74 The Secretary promulgated the regulations pursuant to provi-
sions of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which criminalized the violation
of "such rules and regulations" as the Agriculture Secretary might prom-
ulgate to govern the use and preservation of the reserves.7 This "intersti-
tial" authority was plainly much broader than the authority to determine
the particular types of containers and labels required for oleomargarine
that the Court had approved fourteen years earlier in In re Kollock.
76
The Court justified the delegation in Grimaud on the basis that "[iln the
nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide general
regulations" to cover all forests and conditions, but Congress defined
"[tihe subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate" and established
the underlying policy of protecting the forests "from depredations and
from harmful uses. "r
Similarly, in Mahler v. Eby78 the Court upheld a 1920 immigration act
delegating to the Secretary of Labor the authority to deport, from among
broad classes of deportable aliens, those whom the Secretary determined
were "undesirable residents."7 9  Rejecting the contention that this
authority "furnishes no standard" and was "so uncertain and indefinite"
as to be an invalid delegation, 8° the Court explained:
With the background of a declared policy of Congress to ex-
71. Id.
72, Subsequent cases continued to combine both rationales. See, e.g., Opp Cotton
Mills, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 144-46 (1941); United States v. Rock
Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939).
73. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
74. See id. at 522-23.
75. See id. at 519-21; cf. United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 685-89 (1892) (finding
insufficient statutory authority to declare the violation of a regulation a criminal offense).
76. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
77. See Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 516, 522.
78. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
79. Id. at 36.
80. Id. at 38.
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clude aliens classified in great detail by their undesirable quali-
ties in the Immigration Act of 1917, and in previous legislation
of a similar character, we think the expression "undesirable
residents of the United States" is sufficiently definite to make
the delegation quite within the power of Congress.... Our his-
tory has created a common understanding of the words "unde-
sirable residents" which gives them the quality of a recognized
standard.81
This was a wide and powerful discretionary authority, upheld because
of the Court's willingness to trust that the Secretary shared, and would
adhere to, this "common understanding."
The Court took a similar approach to the delegation of authority at is-
sue in New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States."" New York
Central presented the Court with a challenge to the provision of the In-
terstate Commerce Act that allowed the ICC to approve and authorize
one railroad to control the operations of another, subject only to the
ICC's determination that such common control was "consistent with the
public interest.""n The Court clarified that this criterion was not "a mere
general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide deter-
minations," but rather was a term to be given meaning from the context
of its enactment and the historical function of the ICC.84 The Court ex-
plained that "the term 'public interest' as thus used is not a concept
without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation to adequacy of
transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and effi-
ciency, and to appropriate provision and best use of transportation facili-
ties.
,8 1
The most important case synthesizing the contingent and interstitial ra-
tionales, however, came four years before the New York Central opinion.
81. Id. at 40; see also Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 245-47
(1915) (upholding a state statute delegating authority to the censorship board to approve
only "educational, moral, amusing or harmless" films because these terms "get precision
from the sense and experience of men and become certain and useful guides in reasoning
and conduct").
82. 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
83. Interstate Commerce Act § 5(2), ch. 91., tit. IV, 41 Stat. 474, 481 (1920) (currently
codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11344(c) (1994)).
84. New York Central, 287 U.S. at 24.
85. Id. at 24-25; see also National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26
(1943) (upholding the "public interest, convenience, or necessity" standard for regulation
of broadcast licenses); Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 285 (1933) (describing the "public convenience, interest, or necessity" standard,
when interpreted in context, as not "so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power").
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In J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,8M the Supreme Court stated
what was to become, at least for the rest of the twentieth century, the
litmus test for acceptable delegations. This decision, in a direct out-
growth of Field v. Clark, upheld the Flexible Tariff Act of 1922, which
authorized the President to adjust import tariffs to protect domestic
companies." After noting with approval the value of congressional dele-
gations for purposes both of filling in the details and of meeting future
contingencies, the Court set forth this new standard: "If Congress shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle [to govern exercise of
the delegated authority], such legislative action is not a forbidden delega-
tion of legislative power. ' ' 8
Yet the force of this "intelligible principle" test as a limit upon Con-
gress was almost immediately called into question, proving to be no help
to the appellants in New York Central four years later, who argued in
vain that the Interstate Commerce Act's standard of "in the public inter-
est" was "no definite standard, nor any intelligible principle."s9 Thus, by
the time of the New Deal, the nondelegation doctrine appeared to permit
almost any statutory delegation that provided the delegatee some guid-
ing principle, even if that principle was extremely broad or only implicitly
stated, as long as it sufficed to govern the exercise of the delegated
authority and showed that Congress had made the essential policy deci-
sions.
D. Two New-Deal Invocations of a Restrictive Nondelegation Doctrine
In fairly short order the Supreme Court then struck down two acts of
Congress as unconstitutional delegations of legislative power. On Janu-
ary 7, 1935, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,' the Court invalidated sec-
tion 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Then on May
27, 1935, the Court invalidated section 3 of NIRA in A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States.9'
Enacted in 1933, NIRA formed the core of President Roosevelt's leg-
islative program to bring the nation out of the depression. 92 It delegated
86. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
87. See id. at 409-10.
88. Id. at 406-07, 409.
89. New York Central, 287 U.S. at 16.
90. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
91. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
92. See National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). After the Su-
preme Court held that section 3 of the NIRA was unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry,
Congress modified the Act in 1935, and then repealed it in 1966.
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a variety of authorities to the President to regulate domestic and foreign
commerce, including the power to create new agencies," to approve or
prescribe codes of fair competition within industries,94 to require business
licenses in any industry affecting interstate commerce,95 and to prohibit
interstate transportation of petroleum products exceeding state limits."
Congress' policies behind the Act included removing obstructions to the
free flow of commerce, advocating the organization of industry to en-
courage cooperative action among trade groups, effecting united action
of labor and management, eradicating unfair competitive practices, re-
ducing and relieving unemployment, and conserving natural resources.9,
In Panama Refining, the Court considered the President's authority
under section 9(c) of NIRA to prohibit interstate transportation of pe-
troleum produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of state limits.98
The Court described its task as determining "whether the Congress has
declared a policy with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has
set up a standard for the President's action; ... [and] whether the Con-
gress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the
authority [delegated]. "99 In a decision now frequently regarded as irrec-
oncilable with its precedents, 1°° Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court
that neither section 9 itself, nor NIRA as a whole, including section 1,
declared a policy or established a standard of action with respect to the
interstate transportation of excess petroleum production.' ° Rather, the
Court concluded that section 9(c) "left the matter to the President with-
out standard or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased."' ' The Court held
that in section 9(c) it had at last encountered a delegation exceeding the
limits upon permissible delegations that its previous cases had consis-
tently acknowledged to exist.1'0
Although the Court did not view Panama Refining as undermining its
prior decisions upholding a variety of congressional delegations, the deci-
93. See National Industrial Recovery Act § 2(a), 48 Stat. at 195.
94. See id. § 3(a), (d), 48 Stat. at 196.
95. See id. § 4(b), 48 Stat. at 197-98.
96. See id. § 9(c), 48 Stat. at 200.
97. See id. § 1, 48 Stat. at 195.
98. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
99. Id. at 415.
100. See, e.g., 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 8, § 2.6, at 71; DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 39 (1993).
101. See 293 U.S. at 415-19.
102. Id. at 418.
103. See id. at 430.
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sion in Panama Refining is hard to reconcile, for instance, with the deci-
sion in Mahler v. Eby,""' at least as a matter of jurisprudence.'5 Justice
Cardozo shared this view, dissenting from the decision on the basis that
the Act as a whole provided a sufficient standard to govern the Presi-
dent's exercise of his authority: namely, that the President was to pro-
hibit petroleum shipments "when he believes, in the light of the condi-
tions of the industry as disclosed from time to time, that the prohibition
will tend to effectuate the declared policies of the act. ''
A few months later, the Court in Schechter Poultry addressed the va-
lidity of the President's approval, under section 3(a) of NIRA, of a code
of fair competition adopted by the live poultry industry.cc Under NIRA,
a violation of this code was both a misdemeanor and an unfair method of
competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act." Chief Justice
Hughes again began by setting out the Court's task: "[W]e look to the
statute to see whether Congress... has itself established the standards of
legal obligation, thus performing its essential legislative function, or, by
the failure to enact such standards, has attempted to transfer that func-
tion to others."'0° Although Schechter Poultry reviewed and analyzed the
same standards as Panama Refining-namely, the statutory policies ex-
pressed in section 1 of NIRA-Schechter Poultry addressed the question
anew in the context of the specific subject matter of this delegation."
Schechter Poultry first acknowledged that the delegation at issue in Pan-
ama Refining was limited to the particular subject of interstate transpor-
tation of petroleum, and then queried what, if any, subject matter limits
were contained in the delegation of authority to establish codes of "fair
competition.""' The Court concluded that section 3 was almost limitless,
104. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
105. Some commentators have offered more pragmatic explanations in terms of the
Court's hostility to the exploding role of the federal government during the New Deal.
See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 100, at 39; Peter H. Aranson, et al., A Theory of Leg-
islative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 & n.35 (1982). Other commentators have
explained that the delegation led to an "unedifying spectacle" because the law at issue was
nowhere officially published but remained "hidden in an administrator's desk." Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 612 n.154 (1984); see also Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on
Delegation of Legislative Power 11, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561. 571 & n.38 (1947); 1 DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 8, § 2.6, at 71.
106. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 435 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
107. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1934).
108. See 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1934).
109. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 530 (1934).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 530-32.
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and "sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims
of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in section one."''
This time Justice Cardozo concurred, writing that section 3(a)
amounted to "delegation running riot," essentially giving the President
"a roving commission to inquire into evils and upon discovery correct
them.""' He explained that unlike the delegation in section 9(c), in
which the President had discretion only as to when (if at all) to prohibit
the interstate and foreign transportation of petroleum, section 3(a)'s
delegation of power to promulgate codes of competition allowed the
President vast authority to determine what to do "for the betterment of
business," constrained only by the extent of the federal commerce
power.' 4 Others have agreed that Schechter Poultry presented the Court
with among the most sweeping of congressional delegations, encom-
passing the entire economy and sharing legislative power with private en-
tities."5 Perhaps because of this extreme nature of the delegation in-
volved, Schechter Poultry has had little impact on subsequent cases.
E. Consistent Approval of Congressional Delegations Since the New Deal
Since Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining, the Supreme Court has
consistently upheld every challenged congressional delegation to the ex-
ecutive branch. The cases are legion.116 A few notable examples will suf-
fice to finish setting the stage for a consideration of the vulnerability of
the Line Item Veto Act of 1996; other cases will be discussed in subse-
quent portions of the Article. Although some cases lend themselves to
easy description as either "interstitial" or "contingent" delegations, many
continue to fuse these two original categories. All use as their touch-
stone for acceptable delegations the presence of a sufficient standard or
"intelligible principle" to guide the use of the delegated authority.
112. Id. at 541.
113. Id. at 551,553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 553.
115. See, e.g, American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(citing Schechter Poultry for the proposition that a delegation affecting the whole economy
requires a more precise standard); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 8, § 2.6, at 71-72 (de-
scribing Schechter Poultry as "the most sweeping congressional delegation of all time");
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 494
(1987) (stating a general opposition to the revival of the nondelegation doctrine but con-
ceding that "extreme measures, like that in Schechter Poultry, should be invalidated").
116. For examples, see Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 n.9 (D.D.C.
1986), citing numerous cases. See also the treatments of the nondelegation doctrine in
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, S. DoC. NO. 103-6, at 73-89 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello
eds., 1996), and 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 8, § 2.6, at 66-85.
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Two years after invalidating sections 3(a) and 9(c) of NIRA, the Su-
preme Court echoed the interstitial theme that it had first articulated in
1825 in Wayman, this time in the context of executive authority over
spending, rather than over rulemaking. In Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States,"7 the Court rejected a claim that a revenue measure whose entire
proceeds were to go to a United States dependency, the Philippines,
"with no direction as to the expenditure thereof, constitutes an unlawful
delegation.""' 8 The Court explained:
That Congress has wide discretion in the matter of prescribing
details of expenditures for which it appropriates must, of
course, be plain. Appropriation and other acts of Congress are
replete with instances of general appropriations of large
amounts, to be allotted and expended as directed by designated
government agencies .... The constitutionality of this delega-
tion of authority has never been seriously questioned." 9
Several years later, the Court subtly but substantially expanded upon
the idea of interstitial rulemaking authority that it had first approved
over one hundred years previously. At issue was an act empowering the
Supreme Court to prescribe the rules of the federal district courts.2 Sig-
nificantly, while the Act provided that "[s]aid rules shall neither abridge,
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant," the Act fur-
ther provided that "all laws in conflict [with such rules] shall be of no fur-
ther force or effect" once the Supreme Court had promulgated contrary
rules. 2' In upholding this delegation of rulemaking authority in Sibbach
v. Wilson, the Court explicitly stated that the exercise of this power
could result in the implicit "repeal" of conflicting laws.' 3 Both Sibbach
and Cincinnati Soap became important precedents in defense of the Line
Item Veto Act, as discussed below.
Yakus v. United States 24 provided another example of the Court's syn-
117. 301 U.S. 308 (1937).
118. Id. at 312.
119. Id. at 321-22; see also Gratiot v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 80, 114 (1846)
("A specific appropriation could not be diverted from its object, but general appropria-
tions necessarily implied an application according to the discretion of the department...").
120. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064. This was a predecessor of the Rules
Enabling Acts, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (1994) and 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982) (repealed
1998).
121. Act of June 19, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. at 1064.
122. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
123. See id. at 10; see also Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973) (recognizing
that the result of the use of authority delegated in the Rules Enabling Acts is that a "prior
inconsistent statute [is] deemed to have been repealed").
124. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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thesis of the "contingent legislation" and "interstitial rulemaking"
strands of the nondelegation doctrine. To stabilize commodity prices
during World War II, Congress in the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942 established the Office of Price Administration, headed by a Price
Administrator.'2 6 The Act gave the Administrator temporary authority
to fix prices that "in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable,"
whenever in his judgment prices "have risen or threaten to rise" to an ex-
tent inconsistent with the Act's defined policies. 27 The Court concluded
that Congress had
laid down standards to guide the administrative determination
of both the occasions for the exercise of the price-fixing power,
and the particular prices to be established....
It is no objection that the determination of facts and the in-
ferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory
standards and declaration of policy call for the exercise of
judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative
policy within the prescribed statutory framework.'
Having thus described both contingent and interstitial elements to the
delegation, the Court then restated the theme that
the only concern of courts is to ascertain whether the will of
Congress has been obeyed. This depends.., upon the determi-
nation whether the definition sufficiently marks the field within
which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known
whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative
will.
129
A second theme recurrent in the Supreme Court's twentieth century
delegation cases has been the impact of society's growing complexity
upon "the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination"
among the branches of government34 For instance, on this basis the
Court in American Power & Light Co. v. SEC13 1 upheld Congress' grant
to the Securities and Exchange Commission of authority to require the
dissolution of utility holding companies whose corporate structure the
SEC deemed unduly complicated or whose existence distributed voting
125. See id. at 423-25.
126. See id. at 419; see also Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 201(a), 56 Stat. 23,
29.
127. See 56 Stat. at 24.
128. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 423-25.
129. Id. at 425.
130. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,406 (1928).
131. 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
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power inequitably. 32 The Court concluded that the delegation "is a re-
flection of the necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex
economic and social problems," and that where it would be "impractica-
ble to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules," it is "constitutionally
sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority."'33
A number of cases have relied upon similar justifications to uphold
congressional delegations."' More recently, in Synar v. United States,135 a
three-judge district court including then-Judge Scalia considered a non-
delegation challenge to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act.'36 Among other features, the Act gave the President authority to
cancel permanently a pro rata portion of all congressional appropriations
subject to the Act whenever total appropriations exceeded specified lim-
its.' Relying again on Congress' need to leave certain factual determi-
nations to the executive branch in our increasingly complex society, the
district court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the Act provided insuffi-
cient standards to guide the executive's use of the delegated authority.
3 1
The district court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that this delegation
was "per se invalid because it allows administrators to 'nullify' or 'over-
ride' laws," explaining that:
The Supreme Court previously has upheld delegations which
permit officials to determine when, if ever, a law should take ef-
fect .... In such cases, the Court classifies Congress' action as
legislating in contingency. . . .Viewed in this context, the
authority delegated by the Act does not differ in kind from that
approved in prior cases.
139
132. See id. at 104.
133. Id. at 105.
134. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) (stating that Congress
need not create specific formulas for regulation of programs where the essence of the
delegation was to allow for flexibility and adaptation); National Broad. Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1943) (finding that Congress acted based on its experience
when it created a broad area of regulation for the FCC and set the standards for its regula-
tion of radio); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 312 U.S. 126,145-46 (1941)
(determining that the Constitution does not require Congress to research independently
each fact upon which it bases legislation).
135. 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (three-judge court) (per curiam), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
136. See id. at 1377.
137. Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 252(a)(4), 99 Stat. 1038, 1074 (1985) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
138. See Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1387-89.
139. Id. at 1387.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court did not address the nondelegation issue
but disposed of the case on other grounds.'4
The district court's opinion in Synar also contained a third theme (in
addition to the importance of finding a guiding policy, and the need to
accommodate the complexities of modem society) found in a number of
nondelegation doctrine cases. After reviewing the precedents, the court
observed that nondelegation doctrine analysis was highly fact-specific,
relying "substantially upon factual comparison of the delegation under
challenge with delegations previously adjudicated.' 4' Essentially, this
was a concession that line drawing in the nondelegation area is difficult, a
sentiment echoing similar expressions found in other decisions.' 42 It was
also a concession that Field v. Clark's promise of a clear distinction be-
tween law-making power and law-executing power 43 remained unful-
filled.
Yet, given that since 1935 the Supreme Court has been unwilling to
find any delegations impermissible, one could also have cynically ob-
served that line drawing in fact was quite easy, and indeed no longer
even seemed necessary, when the courts could find nothing to place on
the other side of the line. Thus, it is important to assess the continuing
validity of the nondelegation doctrine as an effective constraint on per-
missible delegations.
II. LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY PURSUITS OF A RENEWED
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Despite its name and avowed purpose, the nondelegation doctrine has
almost universally been used to uphold, rather than to preclude, congres-
sional delegations, provided only that courts can find somewhere a suffi-
cient "intelligible principle" or other meaningful standard to guide the
exercise of the delegated authority.1 " Reflecting that fact, the doctrine
140. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 736.
141. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1384-85.
142. See, e.g., Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 245 (1915) (stat-
ing that while administration and legislation are separate powers, it is difficult to find the
line separating them); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (recognizing the
difficulty in defining the line between legislative power and administrative authority);
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) ("The line has not been exactly
drawn which separates [delegable and nondelegable powers]"); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997) ("This Court has not been notably successful in describing
the [line that separates proper congressional conferral of executive power from unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative authority]; indeed, some think we have abandoned the
effort to do so.").
143. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
144. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2, at 151 (2nd
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today is often termed the delegation doctrine, rather than the nondelega-
tion doctrine."' Nevertheless, in recent decades, a number of scholars
and judges, including the recent D.C. Circuit majority in American
Trucking, have encouraged or hoped for a reinvigoration of a robust
form of the doctrine, which might actually result in the invalidation of
some congressional acts.' 6 Alternatively, others have advocated a refined
form of the essentially permissive version of the doctrine, which would
continue to permit Congress to make sweeping statutory delegations
while demanding greater clarity and uniformity in congressional or ad-
ministrative standards developed to guide the uses of the delegated
authority.
A. Modern Cynicism Toward the Nondelegation Doctrine
Varying degrees of cynicism about (or even enthusiasm for) the impo-
tence of the nondelegation doctrine in the modern administrative state
have accompanied, if not inspired, suggestions for reinvigorating the
doctrine. Just over two decades after the Schechter Poultry and Panama
Refining decisions, Professor Kenneth Davis observed that "[iln [the] ab-
sence of palpable abuse or true congressional abdication, the non-
delegation doctrine to which the Supreme Court has in the past often
paid lip service is without practical force."' 47 This opinion has remained
the prevailing scholarly view.14 1 In the 1978 revision of his administrative
law treatise, Professor Davis more cynically expressed a similar senti-
ment that "[s]ince 1935 the nondelegation doctrine has had no reality in
the holdings," and "has failed in the federal courts," despite the fact that
"remnants of the doctrine persist in judicial verbiage. 14 1
Meanwhile, courts and judges have also at times expressed the view
ed. 1978) (1958) (describing the transformation of the nondelegation doctrine into a per-
missive doctrine that facilitates delegation).
145. See, e.g., Aranson, supra note 105, at 7; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Account-
ability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 400
(1987); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (1985); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 323,324 (1987).
146. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034, 1038, 1057 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
147. DAVIS, supra note 144, § 2.01, at 76.
148. See, e.g., Aranson, supra note 105, at 5 (noting that "most contemporary commen-
tators regard the doctrine as dead, even though the Court refuses to bury it"); Peter H.
Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 775 (1999) (opposing revival of "robust" nondelegation doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein,
Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2111 & n.190 (1990)
(describing the "downfall" of the nondelegation doctrine).
149. DAVIS, supra note 144, §§ 3.1-3.2, at 150.
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that the nondelegation doctrine no longer acts as much of a limit on
Congress' ability to share its legislative authority. Relying on Professor
Davis' treatise, Justice Marshall in 1974 wrote:
The notion that the Constitution narrowly confines the power
of Congress to delegate authority to administrative agencies,
which was briefly in vogue in the 1930's, has been virtually
abandoned by the Court for all practical purposes, at least in
the absence of a delegation creating "the danger of overbroad,
unauthorized, and arbitrary application of criminal sanctions in
an area of [constitutionally] protected freedoms." This doctrine
is surely as moribund as the substantive due process approach
of the same era-for which the Court is fond of writing an
obituary-if not more so.15
Likewise, the D.C. Circuit wrote in 1982 that the doctrine "has often
been declared deceased."'' Judge Skelly Wright, in a review of Profes-
sor Davis' work, wrote that "most scholars rank the delegation doctrine
together with substantive due process, nullification, and common law
forms of action as arcane notions which inexplicably fascinated an earlier
generation but which were given the decent burials they deserved long
ago.,152
One source of cynicism, at least in the D.C. Circuit, may have been the
1971 decision of D.C. Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Connally.53 Writing for a three-judge district court,
Judge Leventhal upheld Congress' delegation to the President of what
the opinion acknowledged was broad authority "'to issue such orders and
regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages
and salaries."' 1 Despite the fact that this delegation left the policy deci-
sion of whether to impose wage and price controls entirely to the Presi-
dent, the court concluded that, "in a context of historical experience with
150. Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the result). The footnote omitted from this quote cites exten-
sively to Kenneth C. Davis' Administrative Law Treatise, supra note 144. See 415 U.S. at
353 n.1.
151. See Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 448-49 n.82 (D.C. Cir.
1982). At the same time, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the existence of "evidence that
the Supreme Court has not written [the delegation doctrine] off," but the circuit court it-
self declined to "pronounce a revival of the delegation doctrine." Id.
152. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582 (1972) (re-
viewing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969)); see also McGowan, supra note 4, at 1127-28 & n.35 (describing the "almost total
demise" of the nondelegation doctrine).
153. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
154. Id. at 745 (quoting Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. II,
§ 202, 84 Stat. 799, 799-800).
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anti-inflation legislation," it could not find "that this delegation was un-
reasoned, or a mere abdication to the President to do whatever he
willed."'
For some, the Supreme Court's more complaisant approach since 1980
to questions of delegation has only heightened this cynicism. In particu-
lar, in the Benzene case,156 the Court reviewed the Occupational Safety
and Health Act's delegation to the Secretary of Labor of authority to
promulgate safety standards "which most adequately assure[], to the ex-
tent feasible, . . .that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health. ' 157 In his concurrence, Justice Rehnquist lamented the Court's
failure to find this delegation unconstitutional, concluding that the Court
had passed up a choice opportunity "to reshoulder the burden of ensur-
ing that Congress itself make the critical policy decisions." 58 In the Cot-
ton Dust case the following year, Justice Rehnquist, now joined by Chief
Justice Burger, again lamented the Court's failure to find unconstitu-
tional this same statute's delegation of authority to set health standards
"to the extent feasible," which he described as "no standard at all." 59
Professor Davis described these cases as marking the arrival of a "new
era" of the nondelegation doctrine, in which Congress was no longer
even required to make the guiding policy decisions.1'6
Nevertheless, to others, Justice Rehnquist's, and then Chief Justice
Burger's, continuing interest in the nondelegation doctrine provided
hope for a revival of the doctrine. In this regard, Justice Rehnquist's
opinions in the Benzene and Cotton Dust cases echoed similar expres-
sions by other Justices whose opinions had on occasion cheered those
seeking to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine. For instance, in 1974
Justices Brennan and Douglas expressed the view that the Bank Secrecy
Act unconstitutionally delegated to the Treasury Secretary the authority
to prescribe bank record keeping and reporting requirements.61
155. Id. at 751, 762.
156. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980).
157. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 6(b)(5), 84
Stat. 1594.
158. 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
159. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 545 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
160. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES § 3:1, at
54 (1989). The Court's subsequent opinions have not adopted Professor Davis' descrip-
tion literally, but have continued to insist upon an "intelligible principle." See, e.g., Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372, 379 (1989).
161. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 91-93 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 90-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Brennan).
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Encouraged by these and other judicial pronouncements, 62 several
prominent scholars have suggested that the courts should revitalize the
doctrine to again invalidate statutory delegations. 6 Others more san-
guinely have proposed that the doctrine instead should be reconstituted
as a theory for a more careful judicial policing of agency actions taken
pursuant to presumptively valid statutory delegations of authority.'
64
B. Ambitious Suggestions for "Reinvigorating" the Nondelegation
Doctrine
A decade before Justice Rehnquist's Benzene and Cotton Dust opin-
ions, D.C. Circuit Judge Skelly Wright advocated the revival of a vigor-
ous form of the nondelegation doctrine. In his review of Professor
Davis' book Discretionary Justice in 1972, Judge Wright shared Professor
Davis' concern that administrative discretion in the United States had
grown so untrammeled and unreviewable as to have become "intoler-
able."'65 Yet he did not share Professor Davis' optimism that agencies
could bear the burden of voluntarily reforming this situation. Rather, he
believed that it was time to demand that Congress reassert control over
the setting of national policy.'6 Furthermore, he believed that the courts
would have to shoulder the primary burden of precipitating such a result,
largely by resuscitating the nondelegation doctrine.167 Although he ac-
knowledged some potential difficulties, principally the problem of how to
define or standardize the amount of congressional control required,'6 he
thought that a revived nondelegation doctrine was not out of reach, and
he discounted those who had abandoned hope in the doctrine. He wrote:
"There is every reason to believe that, with a slight nudge from the
courts, Congress would eagerly reassume its rightful role as the author of
meaningful organic charters for administrative agencies.'
169
162. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 272-77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the result) (describing as an unconstitutional delegation the Defense Secretary's
authority to identify "defense facilities" at which members of communist organizations
were criminally prohibited from employment); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 603,
626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part, with Stewart and Douglas, JJ., joining) (describ-
ing the delegation to the Interior Secretary of the authority to apportion the waters of the
Colorado River as raising the "gravest constitutional doubts").
163. See discussion infra Part II.B.
164. See discussion infra Part II.C.
165. Wright, supra note 152, at 576.
166. See id. at 578-81.
167. See id. at 581.
168. See id. at 586-87.
169. Id. at 584.
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Judge Wright supported his plea for the revival of the nondelegation
doctrine by critiquing the observation sometimes used to defend broad
delegations to agencies, that Congress often lacks the ability or the will
to fashion specific, narrow standards, and hence entrusts this power to
agency expertise. To Judge Wright, this observation demanded not the
abandonment but the reaffirmance of the nondelegation doctrine:
An argument for letting the experts decide when the people's
representatives are uncertain or cannot agree is an argument
for paternalism and against democracy .... The whole reason
we have broadly based representative assemblies is to require
some degree of public consensus before governmental action
occurs. To be sure, we pay a price for awaiting such consensus.
... But... there is a price to be paid for congressional abnega-
tion as well.' 70
Several years later, Judge Carl McGowan, Judge Wright's colleague on
the D.C. Circuit, refined this critique. Writing in 1977, Judge McGowan
suggested a distinction between those congressional delegations that re-
sult purely from "internal political maneuver or as an escape from having
to stand up and be counted" and those that occur because "Congress, in
an increasingly complex and changing world, is called upon to deal with
subject matter that is novel and imprecise, and for which it is frequently
ill-equipped to do more than to paint with a broad brush. 17' He ex-
plained that only in the latter situation was Congress' practice of "leaving
the details to be filled in by less unwieldy and more technically expert
administrative authority" appropriate.12 With respect to the former
situation, he argued that Congress was subverting democratic decision-
making. He therefore hoped that the Supreme Court might find a suit-
able case to revive the nondelegation doctrine and remind Congress of
the constitutional limits on its ability to delegate.'
Approaching the question from a somewhat different angle, in 1977
Professors Lawrence Tribe and Philip Kurland both opined before a
congressional subcommittee that proposed executive branch reorganiza-
tion authority, which would have authorized the President to consolidate
agencies or entirely abolish their functions, would delegate such un-
precedented control over the nation's laws as to be flatly unconstitu-
tional, even under the Supreme Court's lax application of the nondelega-
170. Id. at 585 (footnote omitted).
171. McGowan, supra note 4, at 1128-29.
172. Id. at 1128.
173. See id. at 1129-30.
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tion doctrine. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had employed
narrowing interpretations to uphold otherwise "quite broad delegations
of power," Professor Tribe distinguished the proposed reorganization
authority as "inherently open ended" and "subject to no special proce-
dural checks."'75 Professor Kurland similarly concluded that while the
practice of delegating authority was generally acceptable, the bill before
the committee was not constitutional because it contained nothing but an
unbounded delegation: "none of the statutes which have come before the
Court has had in it only such a delegation provision, which is what you
have here ... nothing but that delegation without any substantive provi-
sions, rules, or principles" to guide the agency.'76 In response to these
hearings, Congress ultimately enacted a modified version of the reor-
ganization legislation that incorporated several limiting principles sug-
gested by Professor Tribe, including prohibitions on using the reorgani-
zation authority to abolish any independent regulatory agency, any
enforcement function, or any statutory program.
177
Meanwhile, other scholars preceded Judges Wright and McGowan in
the view that the nondelegation doctrine might, or in any event should,
again be given real force. Writing in 1969, Theodore Lowi observed that,
despite the oft-heard justification for congressional delegations-that the
complexities of modern society did not lend themselves to clear legisla-
tive standards-"three quarters of a century's experience with the prob-
lems of modem industrial practice" made such standards "both necessary
and desirable today, except for those who wish to see the power of the
democratic state drained away.' '178 He declared: "The Court's rule must
once again become one of declaring invalid and unconstitutional any
delegation of power to an administrative agency that is not accompanied
by clear standards of implementation.' '179 He recognized that following
such a rule would be dramatic, but argued that the status quo alternative
involved the Court in repeated acts of judicial "legislating" in the course
of adopting sufficiently narrow constructions of otherwise unbridled con-
174. See Providing Reorganization Authority to the President, Hearings on H.R. 3131,
H.R. 3407, and H.R. 3442 Before the Legislation and Nat'l Sec. Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95" Cong. 76-89, 134-44 (1977) (statements of Laurence H.
Tribe and Philip B. Kurland).
175. Id. at 80 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe).
176. Id. at 142 (statement of Philip B. Kurland) (emphasis added).
177. See Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, §905, 91 Stat. 31 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 905).
178. THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 146, 154-55 (1969).
179. Id. at 298; see also Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conser-
vatism, and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 303-04 (1987).
Catholic University Law Review
gressional delegations.' 8°
In Democracy and Distrust a decade later, John Hart Ely similarly de-
cried the modern practice which effectively allowed elected representa-
tives to leave many law-making functions to unelected administrators.
8 1
He, too, rejected as a defense for this practice the explanation that Con-
gress often lacks the will to take a specific stand on controversial issues,
instead regarding this state of affairs as "precisely the reason for a non-
delegation doctrine., 182 Professor Ely seemed not too expectant, how-
ever, that the courts would actually reinvigorate the doctrine.
Striking only a slightly more optimistic note shortly after Justice
Rehnquist's Benzene and Cotton Dust opinions, in 1982 professors Peter
H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen 0. Robinson argued for a re-
newed nondelegation doctrine, predicated primarily upon a concern for
reducing what they described as the regulatory Production of private
benefits. Their critique of the practice of delegation amounted to an
economic analysis of the problem of Congress' reluctance to "stand up
and be counted."1 8"' They concluded that an impotent nondelegation doc-
trine facilitated the creation of private-interest legislation that did not
command a consensus or create a public good, while also allowing Con-
gress to shift to agencies much of the costs of settling political conflicts
and yet keep for itself the ability to claim credit. They acknowledged,
however, that courts might be reluctant to provide that "nudge" which
Judge Wright had described as necessary to reinvigorate the nondelega-
tion doctrine, given that broad delegations inherently provided the courts
with greater interpretive power as well.""
Encouraged not only by Justice Rehnquist's opinions in the Benzene
and Cotton Dust cases, but also by the Supreme Court's decision in INS
v. Chadha87 invalidating the legislative veto as an improper exercise of
lawmaking power, Professor David Schoenbrod became a forceful pro-
180. See LOWI, supra note 178, at 298.
181. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980).
182. Id. at 133.
183. See Aranson, supra note 105, at 63, 67 (explaining that despite the difficulty of
reviving the nondelegation doctrine, the idea "has acquired a fresh dignity"). Professor
Gellhorn reiterated this argument several years later. See Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to
First Principles, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 345, 352 (1987).
184. Aranson, supra note 105, at 63-64; see McGowan, supra note 4, at 1128-29.
185. See Aranson, supra note 105, at 63-64.
186. See id. at 67.
187. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). One commentator has described the legislative veto as an
instance of congressional "self-delegation." See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Non-
delegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 711, 715-17 (1997).
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ponent of a revived nondelegation doctrine. Harking back to Field v.
Clark's's' classic statement of the nondelegation principle,' 9 he argued
first in 1985'90 and then in a 1987 symposium,91 a 1993 book,' 9' and again
in a 1999 symposium 193 that courts should prohibit any delegation of
"legislative power," as he sought to define that term. Professor Schoen-
brod explained that a workable, meaningful nondelegation doctrine
should be formulated first by differentiating between "rules statutes" and
"goals statutes."' 94 He then argued that, in regulating private conduct,
Congress should be obligated to enact rules statutes and should be pro-
hibited from using goals statutes to delegate to executive agencies what
amounted to legislative power.19 He was willing, however, to allow
broader delegations of authority concerning the management of public
resources and the conduct of foreign affairs, on the basis that in these ar-
eas Congress was not necessarily delegating its own Article I legislative
powers, but rather was sharing powers also arising under Article IV and
Article II, respectively.!" In these areas, he explained, it was permissible
for Congress tc rely upon goals statutes, rather than rules statutes 97 He
argued that this view obviated "many of the classic examples of the im-
possibility of government" under a vigorous nondelegation doctrine."' 98
In no small part because of the work of Professor Schoenbrod, Car-
dozo Law School convened a symposium in March 1998, in the midst of
the litigation of the Line Item Veto Act, to discuss the nondelegation
doctrine. Although entitled The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelega-
tion Doctrine from Constitutional and Policy Perspectives,'9 contributors
did not exactly argue that the doctrine was "rising." Instead, participants
debated whether the doctrine should be reinvigorated, with several par-
ticipants joining Professor Schoenbrod, in varying degrees, to urge such a
reinvigoration."°
188. 143 U.S. 649 (1891).
189. See supra text accompanying note 23.
190. See Schoenbrod, supra note 145, at 1227.
191. See David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Con-
stitutional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 358-359 (1987).
192. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 100, at 3.
193. See David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 731,732 (1999).
194. Schoenbrod, supra note 145, at 1252-53.
195. See id. at 1254-60.
196. See id. at 1260-71.
197. See id. at 1276.
198. Id.
199. Symposium, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999).
200. See Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20
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C. More Limited Suggestions for "Reconstituting" the Nondelegation
Doctrine
Others have remained skeptical of either the advisability or the prom-
ise of reviving a vigorous nondelegation doctrine. For instance, in 1975,
Professor Richard Stewart asserted that while in some cases courts
through statutory construction might "more carefully limit broad legisla-
tive delegations," nevertheless "any large-scale enforcement of the non-
delegation doctrine would clearly be unwise. ' '  He worried not only
about the need for administrative expertise to respond to the complexity
of contemporary conditions, but also about Congress' institutional
inability to legislate in sufficient detail 2' A decade later, in partial re-
sponse to Professor Schoenbrod and others, and while acknowledging
that "the temper of the times also seems favorable" for a reinvigorated
nondelegation doctrine, Professor Stewart nevertheless continued to op-
pose such a development.0 3 He proposed that the doctrine be used as a
tool to require agencies to create standards where Congress had failed to
do so. He described this as "the possibility of a more modestly conceived
judicial role in policing legislative delegation" through "a policy of nar-
row construction of statutory delegations."20
Professor Kenneth Davis has been the principal advocate of this sort of
modest reformulation of the nondelegation doctrine, in contrast to those
advocating its reinvigoration in its traditional sense. At the same time
that he was describing the doctrine as a "failure" in the courts, Professor
Davis was proposing that the doctrine be "reconstituted" and "given new
life."2 5 He argued that the focus should no longer be upon the suffi-
ciency of Congress' declaration of policy, but on whether administrators
themselves had developed and implemented their own standards to
CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 989-90 (1999); Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondele-
gation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDoZO L. REV. 807, 808 (1999); William A. Niskanen, Leg-
islative Implications of Reasserting Congressional Authority Over Regulations, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 939, 939 (1999); Paul Craig Roberts, How the Law was Lost, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 853, 853 (1999); Nadine Strossen, Delegation as a Danger to Liberty, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 861 (1999).
201. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667, 1695 (1975).
202. See id.
203. Stewart, supra note 145, at 324.
204. Stewart, supra note 201, at 1697. The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984), to defer
to an agency's reasonable construction of its own statutes, and in particular to permit an
executive agency to base such constructions on its own policy choices, obviously greatly
empowers agencies to establish standards where Congress has not. See DAVIS, supra note
160, at 54, 67-70.
205. DAVIS, supra note 144, §3.1, at 150.
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guide their exercise of delegated authority.29 Conceding the modern
administrative state's need for congressional delegations of quasi-
legislative power, Davis saw this reformulated nondelegation doctrine as
the more appropriate way to protect against an arbitrary exercise of
delegated power.Y In part, he favored this approach because the alter-
native effectively permitted "unelected judges [to] decide major ques-
tions of policy in ways that elected legislators have no power to reverse,"
whereas if unelected administrators were to decide those same policy
questions, Congress would "have full authority to reverse."2 8
Courts have occasionally embraced this approach. For instance, in In-
ternational Union, UAW v. OSHA,'°9 the District of Columbia Circuit
considered whether OSHA's construction of a provision of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act was sufficiently limited to withstand a non-
delegation challenge.20 Although the court concluded that the agency's
construction was unreasonably broad, it also concluded that narrower
constructions were possible, and remanded the case to the Secretary of
Labor to give OSHA an opportunity to adopt a construction both "rea-
sonable and consistent with the nondelegation doctrine., 21' The agency
then adopted a construction that the circuit court approved .
The District of Columbia Circuit's May 1999 opinion in American
Trucking is the most recent opinion to follow loosely in this model. Be-
fore the court were provisions of the Clean Air Act requiring the EPA to
set air quality standards at the level "requisite to protect the public
health" with an "adequate margin of safety." '213 The court concluded that
these provisions, which the dissent observed had withstood repeated
court review for almost three decades,1 did not provide a standard for
determining how much of certain pollutants was too much.2 '5 Neverthe-
less, the court declined to invalidate the statute, in order "to give the
agency an opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its own.,
216
The court also intimated that the EPA might have difficulty in articulat-
206. See id. § 3.15, at 206-07.
207. See id.
208. DAVIS, supra note 160, at 58.
209. 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
210. See id. at 1312-13.
211. Id. at 1313.
212. See International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665,668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
213. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)(1994) (directing the EPA to establish air quality standard).
214. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 1034.
216. Id. at 1038.
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ing a satisfactory "intelligible principle," and invited the agency in such a
case to report so to Congress, to seek a legislative solution.217
In reaching this result, the court admitted that it was not serving a key
(and historically the most important) purpose of the nondelegation doc-
trine, namely, ensuring that Congress make important choices of social
policy. 218 Instead, the court relied upon two other rationales for the non-
delegation doctrine: reducing arbitrary uses of delegated authority, and
enhancing the possibility of meaningful judicial review.2 9 The court con-
cluded that serving these two purposes was sufficient, in view of what it
described as the Supreme Court's apparent lack of interest in a "strong
form" of the nondelegation doctrine.22°
Is American Trucking evidence that the more modest reform proposals
of Professors Davis and Stewart have supplanted the more ambitious
calls for a reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine? Or might the
District of Columbia Circuit instead be tempting the Supreme Court to
revive a strong form of the doctrine? Professor Lawrence Lessig has de-
scribed the Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez21' as an exam-
ple of judicial cycling in constitutional interpretation.22 While in Lopez
this cycling occurred in the area of federalism, specifically the limits of
the Commerce Clause (limits that also had lain dormant since 1936 and
had therefore sometimes been described as "dead" or otherwise mean-
221ingless), the question arises whether and when a similar cycling might
occur in the area of separation of powers, specifically the limits of Article
I's vesting of all legislative powers in Congress.224 Before turning to the
217. See id. at 1038, 1040.
218. See id. at 1038.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
222. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 125, 127-29.
223. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of The Commerce Power, 73 VA.
L. REV. 1387, 1387 (1987) (noting that "too much water has passed over the dam" to ex-
pect reinvigoration of meaningful Commerce Clause jurisprudence); Deborah Jones Mer-
ritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 674-75, 698 (1995) (describing the prevailing pre-
Lopez view that the Commerce Clause provided no limit to congressional power).
224. Judge McGowan described this cycling, specifically in the area of separation of
powers, as judicially administering a "shock treatment" to Congress. McGowan, supra
note 4, at 1120, 1130. The Supreme Court's recent "hostility" toward congressional en-
actments generally, see Suzanna Sherry, Some Targets Were Larger Than Others, WASH.
POST, July 4, 1999, at B4, only highlights the possibility that the Court would consider ad-
ministering such a "shock treatment." Professor Richard Stewart has described the possi-
bility of such a cycling concerning the nondelegation doctrine as "a return to constitutional
fundamentalism," Stewart, supra note 145, at 323-24, while Professor Sunstein has de-
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import of Clinton v. City of New York upon these questions, it will be
useful to review four principal nondelegation cases of the past decade, in
which the Supreme Court also declined the invitation to revitalize the
nondelegation doctrine.
D. Contemporary Nondelegation Cases
When the District of Columbia Circuit in American Trucking de-
scribed "current Supreme Court cases" as not "applying the strong form
of the nondelegation doctrine,2 the circuit court's sole reference was to
the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Mistretta v. United States. 6 In
Mistretta, the Court upheld, against an excessive delegation challenge,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sen-
tencing Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.227 The
Act directed the Commission to develop categories of criminal offenses
and defendants, and sentencing ranges for each category, consistent with
federal criminal law.2u Among other constraints, Congress specified
multiple factors for the Commission to consider in structuring both the
offense categories and defendant categories,229 and charged the Commis-
sion with three goals: to meet criminal sentencing's multiple purposes of
deterrence, retribution, public protection, and rehabilitation; to provide
"certainty and fairness" while permitting individualized sentences; and to
reflect "advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the
criminal justice process."
Acknowledging that "the Commission enjoys significant discretion,"
the Court nonetheless "harbor[ed] no doubt that Congress' delegation of
authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and de-
tailed to meet constitutional requirements., 23 It explained that its previ-
ous cases "do not at all suggest that delegations of this type may not
scribed expansive post-New Deal delegations as having granted "legislative, or at least dis-
cretionary, power far beyond what was contemplated by the original Constitution," Cass
R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a Twenty-First Century World, 48 ARK.
L. REv. 1, 6 (1995).
225. American Trucking Assn's, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam).
226. See id.
227. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379, 412 (1989).
228. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (authorizing sentence provi-
sions); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) (establishing the United States Sen-
tencing Commission).
229. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(1)-(7), (d)(1)-(11).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
231. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374, 377.
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carry with them the need to exercise judgment on matters of policy." 23
Rather, "[d]eveloping proportionate penalties for hundreds of different
crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of
intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is
especially appropriate., 233 Justice Scalia dissented, not on the basis that
the delegation lacked sufficient congressional standards, but on the ba-
sis that the authority was being given to a body having absolutely no ex-
ecutive or judicial branch responsibility for enforcing the laws.235 He ex-
plained that lawful delegations had previously always been ancillary to a
delegatee's executive (or adjudicatory) duties, whereas here the Sen-
tencing Commission amounted to "a sort of junior-varsity Congress,"
created out of whole cloth solely to take up Congress' law-making duties
where Congress chose to leave off. 23
6
Later that year, the Court decided Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline.237
At issue was a delegation to the Secretary of the Treasury of authority to
impose safety user fees on operators of natural gas and hazardous liquid
pipelines.'m The Court easily concluded that Congress' guidelines for the
imposition of these fees "satisfy the constitutional requirements of the
nondelegation doctrine as we have previously articulated them," and
turned to the central contention of the case: that because Congress' tax-
ing power was at issue, the Court should employ more stringent nondele-
gation standards.2 39  After reviewing previously approved delegations
arising out of the Constitution's Taxing Clause, the Court rejected this
invitation.24° The same standard applies to delegations of authority-in-
volving Congress' power to tax as to delegations of authority involving
other congressional powers.21
The Supreme Court's two most recent cases considering the nondele-
gation doctrine also involved, like Mistretta, delegated authority to de-
termine criminal sanctions. At issue in Touby v. United States2 was
232. Id. at 378.
233. Id. at 379.
234. See id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What legislated standard, one must wonder,
can possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in
various contexts, a 'public interest' standard?").
235. See id. at 420-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 416-22, 426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
238. See 49 U.S.C. § 60301(a)(1994).
239. Skinner, 490 U.S. at 220.
240. See id. at 220-23.
241. See id. at 223.
242. 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
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power delegated to the Attorney General under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act to decide, pursuant to specified procedures, what substances
to include on the Act's five "schedules" of drugs whose manufacture,
possession, and distribution the Act criminalized."3 As in Skinner, the
central issue here also became not whether Congress had provided a suf-
ficient intelligible principle to guide the Attorney General's delegated
authority, but whether some heightened standard nevertheless should be
required, in this case because it involved criminal sanctions.'" While the
Court left this question unresolved, it concluded, in light of the detailed
procedures and specified determinations required by the Act, that the
Act "passes muster even if greater congressional specificity is required in
the criminal context.,
245
Finally, in Loving v. United States,2" decided two years before Clinton
v. City of New York, the Court faced the question of whether the Presi-
dent could prescribe "aggravating factors" in military capital homicide
cases, for use in determining (under the capital punishment standards of
Furman v. Georgia 7) whether the death penalty was permissible. The
Court found that Congress could delegate this authority to the Presi-
dent,248 and that the "intelligible principle" test was satisfied by the mere
fact that the delegation was within "the traditional authority of the Presi-
dent," who as Commander-in-Chief had an independent duty "to take
responsible and continuing action to superintend the military, including
the courts-martial., 249 Accordingly, the Court was willing to permit the
President to specify aggravating factors "without further guidance" from
Congress. The Court concluded that "[s]eparation-of-powers princi-
ples are vindicated, not disserved, by measured cooperation between the
two political branches of the Government, each contributing to a lawful
objective through its own processes., 251
Thus, at least in these cases, the Court was unresponsive to invitations
that it again use the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate broad congres-
sional grants of authority. Indeed, in Loving the Court acknowledged
243. See id. at 162.
244. See id. at 165-66. Justice Brennan had suggested that delegations of authority
concerning criminal sanctions merit additional scrutiny. See United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 272 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
245. Touby, 500 U.S. at 166.
246. 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
247. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
248. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 759-71.
249. Id. at 771-72.
250. Id. at 773.
251. Id.
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that for over sixty years it had approved "sweeping" delegations,252 and
for at least some types of cases seemed even to back away from a re-
quirement that Congress must establish the policy behind the delegation.
Even before Loving, Professors Davis and Pierce had wondered "why
the Justices abandoned so quickly the interest in a reinvigorated non-
delegation doctrine they expressed in the opinions in Benzene and Cot-
ton Dust."'253 They postulated three reasons: the difficulty of articulating
a standard for distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional
delegations, the Court's "more realistic perspective on the legislative
process," and a recognition "that agencies are politically accountable"
themselves.5 4
These reasons were not enough, however, to dishearten the nondelega-
tion doctrine faithful. The theoretical difficulty of line drawing was not a
new issue after Cotton Dust, but had long been recognized not only by
opponents of a strong nondelegation doctrine but even by those who had
hopes for a revitalized nondelegation doctrine.255 Nor is it apparent why
the Court should have developed any "more realistic" perspective on the
legislative process. As for the Court's "recognition" of agencies' political
accountability, in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
the Court did observe that:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this politi-
cal branch of the Government to make such policy choices-
resolving the competing interests which Congress either inadver-
tently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the
agency charged with administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities.256
Yet, for purposes of dampening the hopes of nondelegation doctrine
supporters, the import of this passage was not much different from the
seventy-year-old principle of J.W. Hampton, that the extent of acceptable
delegation must be judged in light of the "inherent necessities" of gov-
252. See id. at 771.
253. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 8, § 2.6, at 76; see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 54 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that Mistretta
"strongly indicated [the Supreme Court's] lack of interest in reviving the nondelegation
doctrine").
254. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 8, § 2.6, at 76.
255. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 148, at 791 (describing the line-drawing problem as
"insuperable," in opposing a strong nondelegation doctrine); Wright, supra note 152, at
586-87 (acknowledging the need for "systematic thinking" about how to draw lines, in
supporting a revitalized nondelegation doctrine).
256. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865-66 (1984).
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ernmental co-ordination."
Mistretta and subsequent cases therefore failed to extinguish the ardor
of those desiring to revive a strong form of the nondelegation doctrine."8
On the cyclical model, these decisions were but eddies in the ebb and
flow of the Court's constitutional analysis. In fact, to Professor Schoen-
brod, "the Court's discussion of delegation in Loving," as well as the
Court's actual invalidation of acts of Congress in Lopez and the 1997
9 260cases of City of Boerne v. Flores and Printz v. United States, were a
"signal that the Court is now embracing its constitutional duty to provide
meaningful boundaries to the limited powers accorded Congress by the
Constitution."26' He continued to believe that the time was right for the
same sort of change of cycle in the separation-of-powers area that Pro-
fessor Lessig had described Lopez as having precipitated in the federal-
ism area.
Yet if Loving may have suggested that the Court was not yet interested
in inaugurating a new phase in a nondelegation doctrine cycle, Clinton v.
City of New York trumpets this conclusion. Whereas in Loving, Touby,
Skinner, and Mistretta, the Court had ultimately approved the delega-
tions at issue, the Court's consideration of the Line Item Veto Act in City
of New York is significantly different because the Court in fact invali-
dated the challenged delegation. What therefore is portentous to the
long-term force of the nondelegation doctrine is that despite the Court's
disapproval of the Line Item Veto Act and the Act's amenability to a
nondelegation doctrine challenge, the Court refused to use the doctrine
to invalidate the Act, and instead went out of its way to find another, less
satisfactory, rationale to do so.
257. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). Moreover,
this rationale facially does not apply to independent agencies, nor is it clear that even ex-
ecutive branch agencies are (or even should be) always accountable to the President.
258. In particular, Professor Schoenbrod has remained a vocal advocate, see
SCHOENBROD, supra note 100, ultimately appearing with Professor Marci Hamilton as
amici curiae on both occasions when the Supreme Court reviewed the Line Item Veto
Act, see infra text accompanying notes 366-75.
259. 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 as exceeding Congress' enforcement power under § 5 of the 14th Amendment).
260. 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, which mandated that state law enforcement officers conduct background
checks on prospective handgun purchasers, as violative of federalism's "dual sover-
eignty").
261. Brief for Amici Curiae Marci Hamilton and David Schoenbrod at 23, Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (No. 97-1374) [hereinafter Hamilton/Schoenbrod
Brief].
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III. THE LINE ITEM VETO ACT AND ITS VULNERABILITY TO THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Passed with great fanfare in April 1996 by the 104th Congress in ful-
fillment of the Republican Party's Contract with America, the Line Item
Veto Act gave the President authority to cancel congressional appropria-
tions and other federal spending measures in order to reduce the federal
budget deficit.262 Specific statutory standards in the Act conditioned the
President's ability to exercise this cancellation authority. To effect a can-
cellation, Congress required the President to submit, within five days af-
ter signing into law the measure to which the cancellation applied, a spe-
cial message identifying the cancelled item and specifying a number of
findings related thereto. Each cancellation was then subject to congres-
sional disapproval through enactment of overriding legislation, under
expedited legislative procedures established by the Act.
Heralded as providing the President with authority akin to the true
item veto powers possessed by the governors of forty-three states,26' the
Act did not, in actuality, give the President authority to veto items in
proposed legislation. A real item veto would have allowed the President
to strike portions of a bill presented to him by Congress before giving his
approval under the Presentment Clause, thereby allowing only the re-
maining portions of the measure presented to him actually to become
law. The Presentment Clause provides that every bill that has passed
both houses of Congress "shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to
the President," who "[i]f he approve" shall sign the bill, "but if not, he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated," for congressional reconsideration.6 Most commentators
(and many in Congress) shared George Washington's view that a true
item veto would have been unconstitutional because it would violate
these lawmaking requirements of Article I by letting the President return
or "veto" only a portion of a bill, rather than the entire bill presented for
approval.265 Accordingly, the Line Item Veto Act provided the President
262. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200; CONTRACT
WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND
THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 23, 29-31 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994); Ann O'Hanlon, The Contract with America: Scorecard, WASH. POST,
Mar. 27, 1995, at A17.
263. See Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1175
& n.13 (1993).
264. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
265. See Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Sept. 23, 1793), in 33
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1745-1799, at 96 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1940) ("From the nature of the Constitution, I must approve all the parts of a Bill, or re-
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discretionary authority to cancel specific spending and revenue items
only from measures already enacted into law pursuant to Article I's for-
mal lawmaking requirements. 26 The Act thus posed no technical viola-
tion of the lawmaking procedures of Article I. Rather, it amounted to a
legislated delegation of power to change the consequences of enacted
appropriations and other spending measures, for the avowed purpose of
letting the President eliminate wasteful "pork-barrel" spending that
Congress lacked the will to excise itself. 67
The principle that Congress cannot delegate its legislative power
would have seemed an obvious rationale to invalidate such a law, were it
not for the impotence of the nondelegation doctrine. Still, the Act read-
ily drew a nondelegation-doctrine challenge from its opponents.'6  As
next discussed, while features of the Act were amenable to the defense
that Congress had established a policy and provided a sufficient "intelli-
gible principle" to guide the President's use of his cancellation authority,
the Act lacked other limiting features that left it more vulnerable to the
nondelegation doctrine. The Act's challengers nevertheless mounted
their nondelegation attack on the statute only secondarily, arguing first
and foremost that the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the
Constitution's Presentment Clause.
ject it in toto."); see also The Line-Item Veto: A Constitutional Approach: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 36 (1995) (statement of Walter Dellinger, Asst. Att'y Gen-
eral); Brief for Appellant United States at 34, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998) (No. 97-1374) [hereinafter DOJ Brief]; Brief for the United States Senate as Ami-
cus Curiae at 18, City of New York (No. 97-1374) [hereinafter Senate Brief]; Transcript of
Oral Arg. at 5, 7, City of New York (No. 97-1374); Michael B. Rappaport, The President's
Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 736 (1993); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The
Future of the Item Veto, 83 IOWA L. REV. 79, 82, 95-97, 101-03 (1997). But see J. Gregory
Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Why Did President Bush Repudiate the "Inherent" Line Item
Veto?, 9 J.L. & POL. 39, 39 (1992); J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the
Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe & Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437,437 (1990).
266. The Act's cancellation authority applied only to laws resulting from bicameral
congressional action and presidential approval, and did not apply to measures that became
law without the President's signature, either through his inaction after presentment during
the constitutionally prescribed period, or through a congressional override of a presiden-
tial disapproval ("veto") of a bill. See 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)(1997).
267. See Legislative Line-Item Veto Proposals: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
the Budget, 103rd Cong. 60 (1994) (statement of Louis Fisher); 142 CONG. REC. S2929-32,
S2955-57 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statements of Act co-sponsors Sen. McCain & Sen.
Stevens); Editorial, Line-Item Veto: A Tool for Saving, But No Panacea, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
11, 1996, at B8; John F. Harris, Clinton Signs Law for Line-Item Veto, WASH. POST, Apr.
10, 1996, at Al.
268. See infra text accompanying notes 355-75.
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A. Legislative Background of the Line Item Veto Act
Congress enacted the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 as an amendment to
the Impoundment Control Act of 1974.269 A brief description of that Act,
and the factors leading to Congress' decision to amend it, will be helpful
in understanding the operation of the Line Item Veto Act.
The Impoundment Control Act was Congress' response to President
Nixon's assertion of an inherent presidential authority to "impound," or
refuse to spend, appropriated funds.27' This Act sought to control two
forms of impoundments: deferrals, or spending delays over the course of
a single fiscal year, and rescissions, or determinations permanently to
withhold funds. As originally enacted, the Impoundment Control Act
authorized presidential deferrals, subject to Congress' retention of a leg-
islative veto, and permitted the President only to recommend to Congress
the permanent rescission of other spending items.2 ' After the Chadha
Court invalidated the legislative veto mechanism, Congress amended the
Impoundment Control Act to narrow the President's deferral authority,
allowing unilateral presidential deferrals only "to provide for contingen-
cies," "to achieve savings made possible by or through changes in re-
quirements or greater efficiency of operations," or as otherwise specifi-
cally authorized by law.272
Rising federal deficits in the 1980s led Congress to consider additional
methods for controlling spending. In 1985, Congress enacted the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which authorized the President to issue a
"sequestration" order canceling appropriations pro rata across the board
when total appropriations exceeded specified deficit reduction targets. 3
Although the Supreme Court in Bowsher struck down this mechanism
because of the role played by the Comptroller General in the sequestra-
tion process, 274 Congress quickly reenacted similar sequestration author-
ity, this time to be exercised solely by the executive branch."' Despite
269. See Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, tit. X, 88 Stat. 332
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 681 et seq. (1994)).
270. See, e.g., EPA v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 35 (1975) (holding that the ap-
propriation in question required that funds withheld by the Nixon administration be spent
for the purpose specified by Congress); Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER
175-201 (1975) (discussing Nixon administration impoundments).
271. See Impoundment Control Act §§ 1013, 1017, 88 Stat. at 334-35, 337.
272. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 206(a), 101 Stat. 754, 785-86 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1994)).
273. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, tit. II, § 252, 99 Stat. 1038, 1072-78.
274. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
275. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987
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this authority, however, the deficit targets proved unattainable.
As a result, by 1991 Congress was considering additional amendments
to the Impoundment Control Act. One proposal, termed "enhanced re-
scission," was to make some presidential rescissions automatic, subject
only to potential legislative disapproval.276 Another proposal, called "ex-
pedited rescission," was to streamline the processes by which Congress
277
considered whether to approve the President's proposed rescissions.
Meanwhile, some Members of Congress renewed longstanding proposals
to amend the Constitution to give the President a true line-item veto.
7
Alternatively, others proposed adopting "separate enrollment" proce-
dures for presenting each individual spending provision to the President
as a separate bill, for approval or veto pursuant to the Presentment
Clause. 79
After extensive consideration of these alternatives during much of the
104th Congress, in the Line Item Veto Act the Senate and the House ul-
timately settled upon a type of "enhanced rescission," dressed up as an
item veto in order to fulfill a term of the Contract with America. The
Act's potential constitutional infirmities were apparent to both its oppo-
nents and its sponsors. Opponents, for instance, expressed their convic-
tion that the Act was unconstitutional because it "purports to create a
third way by which laws can be made," and publicized their "serene
confidence that [the Act] is constitutionally doomed."'2 Sponsors and
supporters, meanwhile, described the Act as "a major change in the bal-
ance of Government power," 2 which would "chang[e] the fundamental
powers of the Presidency. 2" 3 The sponsors' inclusion of a provision pro-
viding for expedited Supreme Court review was a tacit concession that
§ 102, 101 Stat. at 764-72.
276. See, e.g., S. 206, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995); H.R. 78, 102nd Cong. § 2 (1991).
277. See, e.g., H.R. 2164, 102nd Cong. § 3 (1991).
278. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 6, 104th Cong. (1995); H.J. Res. 4, 103rd Cong. § 1 (1993).
Similar proposals date back to the latter nineteenth century. See, e.g., 9 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4189, 4196 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) (reproducing
President Grant's 1873 Fifth Annual Message containing a request that Congress propose
a constitutional amendment to create the line-item veto power).
279. See, e.g., S. 238, 104th Cong. § 1101 (1995); S. 137, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
280. 142 CONG. REc. S2963 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Levin). Sena-
tor Byrd expressed an additional concern about the Act's potential impact on judicial in-
dependence. See id. at S2942-44 (statement of Sen. Byrd); see also Robert Destro: Whom
Do You Trust, Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse & the Line Item Veto, FED.
LAW., Jan. 1997, at 26, 28; Louis Fisher, Judicial Independence and the Line Item Veto,
JUDGES' J., Winter 1997, at 18, 19, 53.
281. 142 CONG. REC. S2972 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
282. Id. at S2957 (statement of Sen. Stevens).
283. Id. at S2959 (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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the Act would be under a "constitutional cloud" until the Supreme Court
passed on its constitutionality.84 Nevertheless, having been told by the
Supreme Court's Chadha decision that it could not grant the President
impoundment authority while retaining a measure of control in the form
of a legislative veto, Congress opted to try another approach in the Line
Item Veto Act, giving the President a unilateral impoundment authority
that Congress could control only through legislative action.
B. Congressional Policies and Limits Embodied in the Line Item Veto
Act-An Explanation of How the Act Operated
Expanding upon the Impoundment Control Act, the Line Item Veto
Act authorized the President himself permanently to cancel three types
of deficit-increasing items from newly-enacted legislation: "(1) any dollar
amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct
spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit," as the Act defined those
terms.s The Act defined a "dollar amount of discretionary budget
authority" as the entire amount of "budget authority" specified for one
purpose in an appropriation law or in an associated authorizing law or
accompanying committee report.286 In other words, the Act authorized
the President to cancel any single item in what commonly are referred to
as "discretionary appropriations," or spending priorities for which Con-
gress must make a discretionary choice to appropriate funds year to year
(as distinguished from spending for federal entitlement programs). As
long as the particular dollar amount of discretionary budget authority
appropriated for a specific purpose was determinable, the President
could cancel spending for that purpose.
The second type of cancelable item consisted of "new direct spending,"
defined as any provision resulting in "an increase in budget authority or
outlays" for entitlements and other programs not funded through annual
appropriations. 7 In essence, the Act authorized the President to cancel
items that would increase the cost of current entitlements, or that would
284. 141 CONG. REc. S4244 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon). Sev-
eral congressional hearings during the 104th Congress focused extensively on the constitu-
tional issues raised by various proposals to give the President authority akin to an item
veto. See generally S.4 and S.14, Line-Item Veto: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995); The Line-Item Veto: A Constitutional Ap-
proach: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995).
285. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (Supp. 1999).
286. Id. § 691e(7)(A). For the Act's definition of "budget authority," see 2 U.S.C.
§ 622 (1994).
287. Id. § 691e(8).
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fund new entitlement programs, but did not authorize the President to
terminate or reduce existing levels of federal entitlements.
The third type of cancelable item was a "limited tax benefit," which
Congress defined as a "revenue-losing provision which provides a Fed-
eral tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to 100 or fewer bene-
ficiaries" under the tax code, unless available to all similarly-situated
taxpayers, as well as any provision that provides "transitional relief for 10
or fewer beneficiaries." ' The Act directed Congress' Joint Committee
on Taxation to review all proposed tax bills and advise Congress of the
presence therein of any limited tax benefits."9 Congress then had the op-
tion of including in the bill the Joint Committee's identification of any
limited tax benefits, in which case the President could cancel only provi-
sions so identified.2 If the bill did not include the Joint Tax Commit-
tee's identification of the bill's limited tax benefits, the President could
cancel any provision that he concluded met the Act's definition.2 91
Congress established three policy goals that had to be met by any exer-
cise of the Act's cancellation authority. The Act required the President
to determine that a cancellation would: "(i) reduce the Federal budget
deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not
harm the national interest. ' ' The Act also required that, in selecting
items to cancel, the President "consider the legislative history, construc-
tion, and purposes of the law" to which the cancellation applied, "any
specific sources of information referenced in such law," and "the best
available information" outside the law.293
The Act required that cancellations occur within five days (excluding
Sundays) after the President signed a measure into law,2 " and that within
that time the President send Congress a "special message" identifying the
cancelled items.'9 The President's message was to contain six specifica-
288. Id. § 691e(9)(A).
289. See id. § 691f(a).
290. See id. § 691f(b), (c)(1).
291. See id. § 691f(c)(2).
292. Id. § 691(a).
293. Id. § 691(b).
294. See id. § 691(a). The Act denied the President cancellation authority with respect
to measures that became law without his signature. For an argument that this feature of
the Act, by conditioning presidential power on the manner in which a bill became a law,
was independently unconstitutional (though severable), see Michael B. Rappaport, Veto
Burdens and the Line Item Veto Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 771-77, 789, 794-96 (1997); Brief
for Senators Robert C. Byrd, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, at 23, Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (No. 97-1374) [hereinafter Brief for Senators
Byrd, et. al.].
295. See 2 U.S.C. § 691(a).
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tions: (1) the statutory determinations justifying the cancellation, (2)"any
supporting material" for the cancellation, (3) "the reasons for the can-
cellation," (4) "the estimated fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect of
the cancellation," (5) "all facts, circumstances and considerations relating
to" the cancellation, including "the estimated effect of the cancellation
upon the objects, purposes and programs for which the cancelled
authority was provided," and (6) the effect of the cancellation on the
budget sequestration process mandated by the Gramm-Rudman-
296Hollings Act. Each message canceling an item of spending also had to
identify the States and congressional districts affected by that particular
cancellation and by all cancellations that year.2 7
Congress included in the Line Item Veto Act several other significant
limitations upon the President's authority to cancel spending or taxing
items, limitations that could have helped the Act receive favorable
treatment under an impotent nondelegation doctrine. First, the Presi-
dent had no authority to reduce items partially, but could only cancel
"the entire dollar amount" of a particular cancelable item' 8 Congress
therefore required the President to chose to forgo an item in its entirety,
and not merely to scale back the amount of government funding that an
item would receive. Furthermore, the President could not cancel any
provisions setting forth restrictions or conditions on the expenditure of
funds, but could only cancel the expenditures themselves.29 Thus, the
President could not "modify or alter any aspect of the underlying law.""
As an additional constraint, the President could not hold his cancellation
authority in abeyance, to be exercised at any time during the fiscal year,
but had to "use it or lose it" within five days.
The Act established expedited procedures allowing Congress to enact
a new law disapproving the President's cancellations. Under these pro-
cedures, a disapproval bill could be introduced in either House within
five calendar days after receipt of a special message, and could be con-
sidered on a privileged basis during the next thirty days of congressional
session?'° In particular, the Act limited amendments and debate on dis-
approval bills, facilitating Congress' ability to complete timely action on
296. Id. § 691a(b)(1).
297. See id. § 691a(b)(2)(B)-(C).
298. Id. § 691(a); 142 Cong. Rec. S2930 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Act co-
sponsor Sen. McCain).
299. See 2 U.S.C. § 691(a).
300. 142 Cong. Rec. S2930 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. McCain).
301. See 2 U.S.C. § 691d(b), (c)(1).
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disapproval legislation.' In turn, items in enacted disapproval bills were
not subject to cancellation by the President under the Act.0 3
Cancellations were effective upon Congress' receipt of a special mes-
sage from the President, unless and until Congress enacted a disapproval
law. For cancelled appropriations items, the Act dictated that the can-
cellation "rescinded" the budget authority.3 4 For cancelled entitlement
spending or tax benefits, the Act provided that the cancellation pre-
vented the provision "from having legal force or effect."30 5 If Congress
subsequently enacted a disapproval law, either with the President's ap-
proval or, more likely, over his veto of a disapproval bill, the Act pro-
vided that the original cancellation "shall be null and void" and that the
underlying provision "shall be effective as of the original date provided
in the law to which the cancellation applied."3 6
The Act did not permit the President to use cancelled funds for any
purpose but deficit reduction?3 To assure that cancelled funds were not
redirected to other purposes, the Act included a "lockbox" procedure,
which required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to calcu-
late the anticipated deficit reduction from a cancellation. These savings
then are "locked in" in the deficit calculations that OMB is required to
submit to Congress under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,3 and
these calculations in turn govern the amounts that may be spent on other
priorities. By preventing OMB from treating cancelled items as if the
unspent funds were available for other priorities, the Act made the
President choose between spending funds for their particular specified
purpose or devoting them solely to deficit reduction. Once cancelled,
neither the President nor Congress could redirect those funds elsewhere.
Therefore, even cancelled items continued to have a real-world conse-
quence that they would not have had if they had been truly "vetoed" (or
never enacted).
The Act thus had an overriding purpose of reducing the federal deficit,
a purpose that the Act's defenders argued3 amounted to a sufficient "in-
302. See id. § 691d(d)-(f).
303. These procedures furthered one of the purposes that Professor Davis had identi-
fied as important to legitimate delegations, namely, allowing Congress an opportunity to
review and correct the delegatee's exercise of the delegated authority. See supra note 208
and accompanying text.
304. See 2 U.S.C. § 691e(4)(A).
305. Id. § 691e(4)(B)-(C).
306. Id. § 691b(a).
307. See id. §§ 691b(b), 691c.
308. See id. § 691c(a)-(b).
309. See infra notes 376-82 and accompanying text.
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telligible principle" to sustain the Act under the existing nondelegation
doctrine, at least when buttressed by the Act's other limits, including re-
quiring the President to make and report specified findings to Congress.
As described above, Congress arguably had further narrowed the Act's
delegation by requiring that the President exercise his cancellation
authority "now or never," rather than continually threatening to cancel
funding in order to gain leverage over Congress. It further narrowed the
Act's delegation by forcing the President to choose between zero-
funding an item or leaving it fully funded, rather then simply weakening
or scaling back a particular project or program. Yet, these same features
were problematic because they caused the operation of the Act more
closely to resemble an actual item veto.31° Had Congress included a few
other limiting principles to offset these all-or-nothing, now-or never fea-
tures to further distinguish the Act from a true item veto, it could have
enhanced the possibility that the Supreme Court would have upheld the
Act as a permissible delegation. Their omission left the Act vulnerable
to even the moribund nondelegation doctrine.
C. Policies and Limits Lacking in the Line Item Veto Act
Eager to fulfill the terms of the Contract with America, Congress en-
acted the Line Item Veto Act without incorporating a few relatively mi-
nor adjustments that could have significantly reduced the Act's exposure
to constitutional challenge. Foremost among these would have been a
statutory limitation on the amount of federal appropriations or other ex-
penditures that the President could cancel, either in any fiscal year or for
any particular spending measure. Such a limit would have indicated both
that Congress sought a particular amount of deficit reduction, and that
the President did not have the free-ranging authority of a true item veto.
For instance, the Act could have provided that the President could not
cancel any single item costing over one billion dollars, or that total can-
cellations could not exceed one, two, or even five percent of the total ap-
propriations (or alternatively some percentage of the federal budget) for
a given fiscal year.31'
310. See Brief of Appellees Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., et. al. at 46, Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (No. 97-1374) [hereinafter Snake River Brief];
Brief of Appellees City of New York Brief at 37-38, City of New York (No. 97-1374)
[hereinafter City of New York Brief]; see also Transcript of Oral Arg. at 7, City of New
York (No. 97-1374).
311. Concededly, the mechanics of such a limit would be complicated by the need to
account for cancellations of multi-year or no-year appropriations, whose savings would not
be assignable to any single fiscal year, as well as by the issue of whether to account for
each of the three categories of cancelable items (appropriations, new direct spending, and
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While going a long way toward distinguishing the Act's power from a
true item veto, this type of limit would not meaningfully have con-
strained the President's actual authority in any practical way. In fact,
even without any such limit, the President's use of the cancellation
authority during the one federal budget cycle that occurred before the
Supreme Court struck down the Act was quite modest. After signing the
thirteen annual appropriations bills presented to him for signature for
fiscal year 1998, the President cancelled seventy-eight items of discre-
tionary budget authority"' (not including a cancellation subsequently
nullified as not authorized by the terms of the Act itself313). These can-
cellations in total would have saved a little under $500 million for the fis-
cal year, or less than one tenth of one percent of total appropriations for
that year.3 4 Additionally, the President cancelled one item of new direct
spending (the Medicare provision that gave rise to the case of Clinton v.
City of New York), as well as two limited tax benefits (one of which gave
rise to the case of Rubin v. Snake River Potato Growers, the companion
case to City of New York). These three cancellations' estimated savings
were approximately $615 million over five years.3 5 No single cancella-
tion was expected to save more than $317 million, with the exception of
the President's cancellation of an "open season" for federal employees to
change retirement plans. Although this cancellation's estimated savings
limited tax benefits) separately, using individual limits appropriate for each type of
spending, or together, using a single combined limit of some sort.
312. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1998, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,769-71 (1997) (canceling three items from Transportation Depart-
ment appropriation); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1998, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,682-83 (1997) (canceling two items from Interior Department
Appropriation); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,130 (1997) (canceling one item from
Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriation); Military Construction Appropriations Act,
1998, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,452-69 (1997) (canceling fourteen items from Department of De-
fense appropriation); Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1998, 82 Fed.
Reg. 54,564-68 (canceling eight items from Energy Department appropriation); Depart-
ments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 1998, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,766-69 (1997) (canceling seven items from
VAJHUD appropriation); Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administra-
tion and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,683-86 (1997) (can-
celing five items from Agriculture Department appropriation).
313. See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, 62 Fed. Reg.
54,338 (1997) (canceling one item from Treasury Department appropriation); National
Treasury Employees Union v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2399 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 1998) (order
invalidating cancellation of Treasury Department appropriation item as not authorized by
Line Item Veto Act); infra text accompanying note 348.
314. See Clinton's Line-Item Vetoes Show Light Touch, CQ MONITOR, Dec. 6,1997, at 7.
315. See Cancellation Pursuant to Line Item Veto Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,262-67 (1997).
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was approximately $850 million over five years, 316 it was subsequently
nullified as not authorized by the Act itself. In total, all exercises of can-
cellation authority would have saved close to $1.9 billion over five years,
"real money" but nevertheless only about .02% of the $9 trillion of total
federal expenditure anticipated over that same time . 7
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress had granted the President
the power to achieve much more impressive spending reductions, with-
out producing any complaints that the President's resulting discretionary
authority to limit expenditures was unconstitutional. Beginning with fis-
cal year 1969, Congress imposed statutory ceilings upon total spending
requiring the President to keep actual federal expenditures some $6 bil-
lion-or several percent-below appropriated levels.318  Congress pre-
cluded the President from reducing amounts appropriated for the Viet-
nam War, for veterans' benefits, for social security benefits, and for debt
service, but otherwise authorized the President to reduce or eliminate
any expenditure as he saw fit."9 In giving the President this power to re-
duce spending, Congress indicated that amounts the President saved "are
hereby rescinded."'32 Using this authority, President Nixon saved billions
of dollars from dozens of federal programs."' Congress provided the
President with similar authority for fiscal years 1970 and 1971 as well.322
Of course, it would have been politically difficult for Congress simi-
larly to have capped the cancellation authority that it gave to the Presi-
dent in the Line Item Veto Act, precisely because such a cap would have
further distinguished the Act from a true item veto. The Contract with
America had promised a line item veto, and it was more important to
deliver on this promise than to give the President a constitutionally sus-
tainable power to restrain pork barrel spending. Thus, even though it
was highly unlikely that a President would ever find occasion unilaterally
to cancel large spending items, Congress insisted on giving him this sym-
316. See 62 Fed. Reg. 54,338.
317. See Alan Fram, President Clinton Has Completed His First Year..,I AP, Dec. 3,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2566369.
318. See Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, §§ 202-03,
82 Stat. 251, 271-72. In addition to reducing actual outlays, the President also was required
to keep the government's incurrence of new obligations $10 billion below authorized lev-
els. See id.
319. See id.
320. Id. § 203.
321. See 115 CONG. REc. 21,277-78 (1969) (Joint statement of David M. Kennedy,
Secretary of the Treasury, and Robert P. Mayo, Director of the Bureau of the Budget).
322. See Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-305, §§ 401, 501, 84
Stat. 376, 405-07 (1970); Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-47,
§ 401, 83 Stat. 49, 82-83 (1969).
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bolic power as well. Furthermore, to have capped the cancellation
authority would have been to admit that the Act was not likely to make a
meaningful dent in the deficit. The Act's supporters would not have
323
wanted to concede this rhetorical weapon, even though from the outset
most thoughtful observers had been confident that the Act's deficit re-
duction impact would be minor.324
Another obvious difference between the late 1960s spending ceilings
and the Line Item Veto Act was that the former required the President
to achieve specified savings, while the latter merely authorized the Presi-
dent to cancel items subject to the Act. Indeed, a number of nondelega-
tion doctrine precedents had sustained the delegated authority in part
because the President or administrative body was required to act when
congressionally specified conditions occurred.3" The Line Item Veto Act
could easily have been redrafted to require that the President cancel
items subject to the Act whenever he determined that the national inter-
est was better served by devoting the savings to deficit reduction than by
spending the funds for their designated purpose. In practice, such a re-
quirement also would not meaningfully have narrowed the President's
discretion to determine what items to cancel. Yet, at the same time, it
would have somewhat dissipated the Act's opponents' ability to argue
that Congress had left the essential policy choices to the President.326
Also lacking from the Act was much evidence of a common under-
standing about the kind of items that Congress expected the President to
cancel as unnecessary pork-barrel or private-interest spending. Previous
323. In fact, Senator McCain, among others, expressed disappointment that the Presi-
dent had not used the Act's cancellation authority more aggressively. See Fram, supra
note 317.
324. See, e.g, Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item
Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1605, 1606-07 (1997) (predicting Act's budgetary im-
pact to be "far less consequential than either supporters or opponents let on"); Editorial,
A Veto Veto, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1998, at A24 (arguing that if upheld, the Act's long-
term effect will not be fiscal, but political); Editorial, supra note 267, at B8 (reporting
skeptics complaining that Act "would not do much to cut federal spending"); Robert D.
Reischauer, Line-Item Veto Won't Offer Big Bite, NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 1996, at A45 (ar-
guing Act will not reduce spending but merely produce different expenditures); Harris,
supra note 267, at 41 (attributing to Senator McCain the view that Act would not itself
sharply curb total spending); Peter M. Shane, Line-Item Veto's Political Web, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 19, 1996, at 20 (arguing Act "may undermine Congress's already
questionable fiscal discipline" and result in few spending cancellations).
325. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 787 (1948) (noting that the dele-
gatee was "required to act" upon specified circumstances); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,
693 (1892) (determining that the President "had no discretion in the premises" but had
"duty" to act upon ascertaining specified conditions).
326. See infra notes 373, 391-92, and accompanying text.
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delegations had been sustained on the basis that they built upon a shared
"sense and experience , 311 of the meaning of certain statutory limits, or
presumed a "common understanding, 328 of how the delegated authority
should be exercised.329 But the Line Item Veto Act's statutory purpose
of reducing the federal budget deficit, without impairing any essential
government function or harming the national interest, was accompanied
by little such shared background, other than a generalized sense that fed-
eral spending measures had become too larded up with unnecessary
pork. Nor did Congress make much effort to supplement this lack, either
in the Act itself or through its legislative history. Although the Act did
further require that the President consider "the legislative history, con-
struction, and purposes" of the particular law from which he desired to
cancel an item, and that he consider the cancellation's impact on the fed-
eral programs and states and congressional districts affected,33 Congress
did not clarify, either in the Line Item Veto Act or its legislative history,
precisely what use the President was to make of these considerations.
Not surprisingly, therefore, once the President began using his author-
ity, some Members of Congress who in principle had supported the Line
Item Veto Act discovered that they were not so enamored with it in
practice. For instance, Senator Robert Bennett forthrightly confessed
that, despite having "enthusiastically voted for the line item veto," he
now regretted having done so, having watched the Act become "the
source of mischief., 33  Although the President's cancellations were
squarely within the literal terms of the types of spending items whose
cancellation Congress had authorized, others also began to complain that
the President's implementation of the Act was not true to Congress' in-
tention. The special message generating the greatest such criticism was
that containing the President's cancellations of thirty-eight items in the
1998 Military Construction Appropriation Act.332 In response, Congress
passed its sole disapproval bill, which the President then vetoed, and
which Congress then enacted notwithstanding the veto. 33 While to some
327. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 246 (1915).
328. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40 (1924).
329. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
331. 144 CONG. REC. S698 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
332. See Pub. L. No. 105-45, 111 Stat. 1142 (1997).
333. See Pub. L. No. 105-159, 112 Stat. 19 (1998). The process of enacting this law be-
gan with the passage of House Bill 2631. See H.R. 2631, 105th Cong. (1997). Pursuant to
the Presentment Clause, the President returned this bill to Congress without his approval
on the final day of the first session of the 105th Congress, see 143 Cong. Rec. H10942
(daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997), and Congress then overrode this veto during the second session
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this sequence showed that the Act was functioning exactly as it should,
34
others nevertheless remained concerned that Congress had not provided
the President more guidance about the types of items that it wanted to
permit him to cancel.335 This was but another omission, partially ex-
ploited by the Act's opponents,336 that left the Act exceptionally vulner-
able to a nondelegation challenge.
D. Overview of Litigation Challenging the Line Item Veto Act
By its terms, the Line Item Veto Act became effective on January 1,
1997.337 On January 2, 1997, six Members of Congress who had voted
against the Act commenced a lawsuit alleging that it was unconstitu-
tional.33' They relied on the Presentment Clause (rather than on the
nondelegation doctrine),339 presumably not only because of the weakness
of a nondelegation doctrine argument before the district court, but also
because as Members of Congress they had little interest in reviving a
strong nondelegation doctrine, which could threaten many other meas-
ures they had helped enact.
After rejecting the government's defense that these plaintiffs lacked
standing, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
found the Act unconstitutional.m The defendants then directly appealed
to the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Act's expedited judicial review
provision. 34' In June 1997, in Raines v. Byrd,342 the Supreme Court con-
of the 105th Congress, see 144 CONG. REC. S999-S1000 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1998). Several
other disapproval bills were introduced but not acted upon. See S. 1157, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. 2444, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1144, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2436, 105th Cong.
(1997).
334. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H359-60 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Solomon); 144 CONG. REC. S963 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1998) (statement of Sen. McCain); id.
at S966 (statement of Sen. Hutchison); id. at S996-97 (statement of Sen. Stevens).
335. See, e.g., Darlene Superville, House Overrides Clinton Veto of 38 Military Proj-
ects, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERVICE, Feb. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7383166; 144
CONG. REC. H359 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. Packard); id. at H360
(statement of Rep. Bereuter); id. at H360-61 (statement of Rep. Stenholm); 144 CONG.
REC. S969 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1998) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
336. See infra notes 355-65 and accompanying text.
337. See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 5, 110 Stat. 1200, 1212 (1996).
338. See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 27 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting that the suit was
filed immediately after Act took effect). Even earlier, on the day of the Act's April 1996
enactment, the National Treasury Employees Union had filed a suit challenging the Act's
constitutionality, which the district court promptly dismissed for lack of standing. See Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423,1425 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
339. See Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 27, 33-35.
340. See id. at 30-31, 38.
341. See 2 U.S.C. § 692(b) (Supp. 1999).
342. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
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cluded that the Member plaintiffs lacked standing, and therefore vacated
the district court's judgment.34 Justice Stevens not only dissented on the
standing question, but also disclosed that had the Court reached the
merits, he would have found the Act unconstitutional.'"
Shortly thereafter, the President began exercising the Act's cancella-
tion authority. Three separate lawsuits followed, each challenging a par-
ticular cancellation. The first was brought by the City of New York and
several health care organizations, challenging the President's cancellation
of an item of new direct spending that would have guaranteed federal
reimbursements to New York State for certain Medicare costs. 1 5 An-
other lawsuit was brought by the National Treasury Employees Union,
challenging the President's cancellation of an appropriation provision
providing federal employees an open season to change retirement
plans.?" The third lawsuit was brought by the Snake River Potato Grow-
ers Cooperative, challenging the cancellation of a limited tax benefit that
allegedly would have made it easier for the Cooperative to purchase ag-
ricultural processing facilities. 47 These three cases then were consoli-
dated before the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.
Prior to the district court argument, the parties settled the second of
these three lawsuits when the government conceded that the President's
cancellation of the federal employees' retirement plan open season had
exceeded the authority granted to him by the Line Item Veto Act.34 Af-
ter hearing argument on the remaining two cases, the district court again
concluded that the Act was unconstitutional, both because it violated the
Presentment Clause, and alternatively because it "impermissibly
crosse[d] the line between acceptable delegations of rulemaking author-
ity and unauthorized surrender to the President of an inherently legisla-
tive function, namely, the authority to permanently shape laws and pack-
343. See id. at 830.
344. See id. at 835, 838 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
345. See City of New York v. Clinton, Civ. No. 97-2393 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 16, 1997).
346. See National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2399
(D.D.C. filed Oct. 16, 1997).
347. See Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. v. Rubin, Civ. No. 97-2463 (D.D.C. filed
Oct. 21, 1997).
348. See National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2399
(D.D.C. Jan. 6, 1998) (order granting plaintiffs partial summary judgment). Although the
President had relied upon his power to cancel "discretionary budget authority," the ad-
ministration conceded that the open season provision did not fit within this category. See
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age legislation. '' 349  This, the district court concluded, was a "non-
delegable" legislative authority.350 The government then again took a di-
rect appeal of the consolidated cases to the Supreme Court. The result
was Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in City of New York affirming
the district court, to be discussed in Part IV below after reviewing the ar-
guments made against the Act.
E. Arguments Made Against the Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. City of
New York
Following the lead set by the plaintiffs in Raines v. Byrd, the challen-
gers of the Line Item Veto Act in City of New York did not base their ar-
gument that the Act was unconstitutional primarily on the nondelegation
doctrine, but instead on the lawmaking requirements of Article I. For
instance, the Snake River plaintiffs prefaced the merits argument of their
Supreme Court brief with the assertion that the nondelegation doctrine
was not even the applicable standard "because the Act does not delegate
a discretionary power to the President" to execute the laws, but rather
"conveys to him, acting alone, part of the power to shape the law itself
.... ,,351 They then claimed that "[t]he fundamental constitutional point
on which this case turns was stated ... in Field v. Clark: 'That Congress
cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle univer-
sally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution."'352 Yet, this was not a non-
delegation doctrine argument that Congress had delegated power with-
out a sufficient intelligible principle. Rather, it was a nondelegation ar-
gument from first principles, measured against the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" for making laws estab-
lished by Article I, 353 that Congress had tried to give away a nondelegable
power. A similar assertion-that the Act impermissibly gave the Presi-
dent power to make and repeal laws in violation of Article I-was at the
349. City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 178-79, 181 (D.D.C. 1998).
350. See id. at 181.
351. Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 18.
352. Id. at 39 (citation omitted); see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
353. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); City of New York Brief, supra note 310,
at 28; Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 2, 29. As Snake River expressed it in re-
sponding to the government's jurisdictional statement, the President's cancellation of a
limited tax benefit had "removed" that provision from the tax code "as completely as if [it]
had never been enacted." Memorandum of Appellees Snake River Potato Growers, Inc.,
et al. in Response to Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417 (1998) (No. 97-1374).
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core of the argument made by the City of New York plaintiffs.34
Nevertheless, both these parties and their supporting amici also argued
in the alternative that even if the nondelegation doctrine were the appli-
cable standard, the Act also would contravene the doctrine because "the
Act sets forth no 'intelligible principles' constraining presidential exer-
cise of the cancellation power . .. ."5 Both the Snake River plaintiffs
and the City of New York plaintiffs dismissed the Act's three required
determinations that cancellation reduce the deficit, not impair essential
Government functions, and not harm the national interest. 56 They
deemed the deficit reduction requirement tautological, because by defi-
nition any spending cancellation would reduce the deficit, provided that
a deficit then existed."7 They also condemned the other two require-
ments as merely negatives, which provided no affirmative guidance and
"no basis for anyone other than the President to judge whether an item
should be vetoed ... .,35 In this regard, both sets of plaintiffs also made
the point that the Act "makes no serious pretense of providing any
'check""'3 9 of the sort that the Supreme Court envisioned in Chadha,
when it wrote that executive action pursuant to a lawful delegation "is
always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it;
and if that authority is exceeded is open to judicial review .... ,60 The
Snake River plaintiffs then concluded, in a tacit concession of the weak-
ness of the current nondelegation doctrine, that "[i]f the delegation doc-
trine imposes any continuing limits on congressional transfer of power to
the President, they have been exceeded here.
361
Four separate groups of amici curiae, including the congressional
plaintiffs found to have lacked standing in Raines, also filed briefs chal-
• • • 162
lenging the Act's constitutionality. They argued variously that the Act
354. See City of New York Brief, supra note 310, at 8-9, 31-33.
355. Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 18; City of New York Brief, supra note 310,
at 37-38 (arguing that the "President is guided by no standard" in making cancellations).
356. See Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 45-46; City of New York Brief, supra
note 310, at 38-39.
357. See Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 45; City of New York Brief, supra note
310, at 38.
358. Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 45-46; see City of New York Brief, supra
note 310, at 38 & n.25.
359. Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 45; see City of New York Brief, supra note
310, at 38-39 & n.26.
360. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983). Accordingly, the Act arguably
vested in the President a "power... that could reasonably be characterized as arbitrary."
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 387 (1907).
361. Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 48.
362. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,420 (1998).
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gave the President an irreversible authority to alter substantive law with-
out any real congressional limits;... was an attempt to circumvent Article
I's bicameralism requirements by leaving all policy decisions to the
President;36 and amounted to an "unprecedented attempt" to delegate
the "basic legislative function" of repealing laws, without providing any
intelligible principle."5
More interesting for purposes of this Article, however, was the amicus
brief filed by Professors Marci Hamilton and David Schoenbrod, urging,
as they had for more than a decade, a reinvigoration of the nondelega-
tion doctrine."' These professors also had filed an amicus curiae brief in
the Supreme Court in Raines, arguing that the district court's reasoning
in that case "eviscerates [the Supreme] Court's nondelegation doctrine
even though it reaches the right result" of striking down the Act.367
Again arguing one year later in City of New York that the Act was un-
constitutional, Professors Hamilton and Schoenbrod similarly prefaced
their brief with the claim that "the district court's reasoning unnecessar-
ily complicates this Court's nondelegation doctrine." Although they
then described the existing nondelegation doctrine as "adequate to ana-
lyze and invalidate the Line Item Veto Act," they also maintained that
the doctrine "has lost sight of its constitutional moorings." 369 They urged
the Court to use the Line Item Veto Act to rediscover those moorings:
[T]he time has come for this Court to return to the Framers'
and this Court's original understanding and application of the
nondelegation doctrine.
Whether this Court embraces its existing nondelegation doc-
trine or begins to craft a doctrine truer to its constitutional ori-
gins, the Line Item Veto Act is unconstitutional.37 °
In particular, Professors Hamilton and Schoenbrod claimed that the
district court erred when it chose not even to apply the "intelligible prin-
ciple" test to the Line Item Veto Act on the basis that "the Act delegates
'non-delegable legislative authority' by empowering the President to
363. See Brief for Amici Curiae Representatives Henry A. Waxman, et al. at 26-28,
City of New York (No. 97-1374) [hereinafter Brief for Representatives Waxman, et al.
364. See Brief for Senators Byrd, et al., supra note 294, at 22-28.
365. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Bar Association of the City of New York at 10, 13,
City of New York (No. 97-1374).
366. See generally Hamilton/Schoenbrod Brief, supra note 261.
367. Brief for Amici Curiae David Schoenbrod and Marci Hamilton at 1, Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (No. 96-1671).
368. Hamilton/Schoenbrod Brief, supra note 261, at 1.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 2-3.
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'make permanent changes to' a law."37' They argued that the perma-
nence of the President's action was irrelevant to the propriety of the
delegation,372 and that what mattered instead was that the delegation al-
lowed the President to "negate a legislative policy determination. '' 7 In
their view, the nondelegation doctrine, even in its present condition, pro-
vided a straightforward basis for invalidating the Act.74 They also urged
the Court to refashion the nondelegation doctrine "on a more internally
consistent and less political plane" by abandoning the intelligible princi-
ple test in favor of Professor Schoenbrod's proposed rule flatly prohibit-
ing the delegation of legislative powers, as he had defined them.375
F. The Most Promising Nondelegation Doctrine Challenge
The most promising nondelegation doctrine argument for striking
down the Line Item Veto Act, however, was an argument that the chal-
lengers' briefs touched upon, but did not articulate forcefully. To cap-
ture this argument first requires a fuller discussion of the nondelegation
doctrine arguments made in defense of the Act, and the responses
thereto.
Defenders of the Act, including the Justice Department, the United
States Senate (appearing as amicus curiae), and several House Members
(also appearing as amici curiae), had each employed the permissive non-
delegation doctrine precedents to argue that Congress could and repeat-
edly did permit executive branch officials to make discretionary policy
choices, including choices that would negate or nullify prior law.376 They
also argued that in the Line Item Veto Act Congress had provided the
President with "criteria that are at least as 'intelligible' as those previ-
ously approved by this Court. 3 7  They relied heavily on Congress' his-
torical delegation of discretionary control over revenue and appropria-
371. Id. at 6-7 (quoting City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 181 (D.D.C.
1998)).
372. See id. at 7. "Indeed, the danger to liberty may be even greater when the agency
willy-nilly can change its regulatory laws.... Thus, the power [to cancel] may be margin-
ally better than the power to make a series of changes." Id. at 8.
373. Id. at 7.
374. See id. at 4-6, 9.
375. Id. at 20-21; see supra text accompanying notes 190-98; see also SCHOENBROD,
supra note 100, at 157-58, 180-81.
376. See DOJ Brief, supra note 265, at 36-38 & n.23, 40; Senate Brief, supra note 265,
at 23-25, 29-30; Brief for Representatives Dan Burton, et aL, at 8-11, 14-15, Clinton v. City
of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (No. 97-1374).
377. DOJ Brief, supra note 265, at 46-47; see Senate Brief, supra note 265, at 25-28.
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tions,37 8 coupled with the Supreme Court's recognition of the latitude that
Congress enjoyed in "prescribing details of expenditures."37 9 In this light,
they hoped that the Act's deficit-reduction purpose and the Supreme
Court's permissive approach to congressional delegations over the past
sixty years, ° capped by the Court's recent refusals to employ the non-
delegation doctrine in cases such as Mistretta and Loving,38 would sustain
the Line Item Veto Act.3
In seeking to respond to these arguments, the Act's challengers con-
tinued to distinguish between the two types of delegated authority that
the Supreme Court had first approved in the early nineteenth century,
those involving "interstitial rulemaking" and those involving "contingent
legislation., 383 Even though for most of this century the Court had essen-
tially collapsed these two lines of cases into the single question of
whether Congress had sufficiently established the policy to guide the
delegation,3 both the City of New York plaintiffs and the Snake River
plaintiffs found value in separating these two categories. They could
then seek to reject the Line Item Veto Act as implicating neither the
sorts of delegated gap filling or fact finding that these two categories had
permitted.
For instance, the Snake River plaintiffs argued that the delegation
cases cited by the Line Item Veto Act's defenders
generally involved delegations to the President and administra-
tive agencies to "fill up the details" of general provisions of law.
... To be sure, the gaps to be filled are sometimes wide, as in
the statute giving the FCC the power to grant radio licenses "if
public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served
thereby." But even such delegations are constrained by the his-
torical context and policies of the substantive statute, and do
not permit the delegate to overrule or to cancel what Congress
378. See DOJ Brief, supra note 265, at 2-6, 42-44; Senate Brief, supra note 265, at 3-17.
379. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937); see supra notes
117-19 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 116-43 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 226-51 and accompanying text.
382. Even after the decision in City of New York, one commentator has relied on these
same arguments to suggest that the Act's authority to cancel discretionary appropriations,
which was not explicitly at issue in the case, may have survived the decision, and if so,
should pass muster under the nondelegation doctrine. See Garrett, supra note 21, at 891-
903. Professor Garrett also argues that, although it is a closer question, the Act's authority
to cancel tax benefit provisions also should have been upheld under the doctrine. See id.
at 903-12.
383. See supra Parts I.A.-B.
384. See supra Part I.C.
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has specifically prescribed.385
Similarly, the City of New York plaintiffs argued that interstitial dele-
gations are permitted only to allow the President "to implement federal
law,... not.., to extinguish it. ' '3" The Act's challengers thus sought to
distinguish interstitial rulemaking authority as different in kind from the
Act's delegated authority to nullify or cancel the effect of a statute. Of
course, this distinction ignored the fact that the idea of interstitial rule-
making had served as the predicate for the Supreme Court's decision in
Sibbach upholding the predecessor of the Rules Enabling Acts, which
had authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate procedural rules for
lower federal courts that could wholly nullify conflicting statutory provi-
sions.3
Nevertheless, the Line Item Veto Act's challengers could fairly de-
scribe the Act's cancellation authority as closer to the types of contingent
authority to repeal or nullify federal tariff laws that the Court had ap-
proved in Field v. Clark3" and J.W. Hampton.3 9 The City of New York
plaintiffs then sought to distinguish these cases as
merely uphold[ing] the congressional practice of "legislating in
the contingency," where Congress exercises its Article I power
to prescribe the conditions under which a law will cease to exist
or to be operative, and the President exercises his Article II
powers to determine whether the prescribed conditions are sat-
isfied and to implement the will of Congress accordingly. 39
The Act's challengers argued that such contingent delegations were
"upheld... precisely because they did not vest the President with discre-
tion to repeal or otherwise extinguish federal laws."39' Rather, it allowed
him only to execute the expressed will of Congress, as delimited by
whatever specific contingency Congress had required the President to as-
certain before exercising the delegated authority. In contrast, they ar-
gued that in canceling items under the Line Item Veto Act, "the Presi-
dent exercises his own will, not Congress'.392
385. Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 47-48 (citations omitted).
386. City of New York Brief, supra note 310, at 42-43; see also Snake River Brief, su-
pra note 310, at 47-48 & n.41.
387. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
388. 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
389. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404 (1928).
390. City of New York Brief, supra note 310, at 9.
391. Id. at 34 (emphasis added); see also Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 42-44.
392. City of New York Brief, supra note 310, at 9, 34-37, 43; see Snake River Brief, su-
pra note 310, at 41-45. The Snake River plaintiffs also sought to distinguish these cases as
limited to foreign affairs, in which nondelegation doctrine limits might be weaker. See id.
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One weakness in this argument was that at one level, Congress' will-
re-expressed by definition whenever Congress enacted a measure
without exempting its spending items from the cancellation authority of
the Line Item Veto Act-was that the President have a discretionary
choice between spending the appropriated sum either for the specified
item or, through exercise of the Act's cancellation authority, for deficit
reduction. In other words, the Act's authority could fairly be analogized
to a statute appropriating x dollars, to be spent at the President's
discretion either for purpose z or for deficit reduction. It would be hard
to argue that such a statute was any worse, on nondelegation principles,
than a lump-sum appropriation393 that did not specify how it should be
spent. In addition, such a statute arguably no more nullified the will of
Congress than the sort of delegation of "policymaking responsibilities"
that the Supreme Court had described with approval in Chevron as
occurring whenever Congress has been "unable to forge a coalition on
either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their
chances" with the agency."
Another weakness with this argument was that it ignored the Rules
Enabling Acts,395 as well as the wage-price controls at issue in Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters,3 both of which also could have been described as
delegating discretionary power to implement not Congress' will but the
delegatee's. Furthermore, statutes permitting the President to repeal a
provision upon the occurrence of a specified contingency have often, in
fact, given the President substantial discretion to determine whether that
contingency has occurred, notwithstanding characterizations to the con-
trary. For example, a statute giving the President authority to render a
at 44 n.39.
393. Congress' authority to make lump-sum appropriations has always been accepted.
See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (discussing an agency's traditional dis-
cretion in allocating lump-sum appropriation); Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of
1937, ch. 401, tit. I, § 1, 50 Stat. 352, 353 (appropriating $1.5 billion (roughly one fifth of
federal budget) for use at the President's discretion); 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 889-90 (1793)
(debating the wisdom of making aggregate appropriations).
394. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984).
395. The Snake River plaintiffs included a curious footnote asserting that the Rules
Enabling Acts "have no bearing" on the Line Item Veto Act because they concerned the
relationship between Article I and Article III, rather than between Article I and Article
II, and also incorrectly asserting that the constitutional questions concerning the Rules
Enabling Acts have never been adjudicated. See Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 44
n.38. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court upheld the predecessor of the Rules
Enabling Acts in Sibbach. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. A more prom-
ising distinction of the Rules Enabling Acts is suggested infra note 402.
396. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
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provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961397 "of no further force
and effect" upon his determination "that the resumption of full military
cooperation with Turkey is in the national interest of the United
States, 398 obviously gave the President unilateral, policy-making discre-
tion, as did an early nineteenth century statute authorizing the President
to suspend a customs law "if in his judgment the public interest should
require it. '
399
Thus, the Line Item Veto Act's supporters were able defensibly to
claim that no particular feature of the Act was unprecedented in the an-
nals of approved congressional delegations: Congress previously had
delegated discretionary authority to nullify a statutory provision (e.g.,
Sibbach); to do so permanently and irreversibly (e.g., Synar4); to make
independent policy decisions contemporaneously with a congressional
delegation of authority, without requiring an intervening occurrence of a
specified contingency (e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters); and to imple-
ment the President's own policy preferences, rather than Congress' (e.g.,
Chevron, Loving4°').
What the Supreme Court had not previously upheld, however, was the
delegation of an irreversible authority to effectuate the equivalent of a
repeal where the delegation contemplated no subsequent change in cir-
cumstance, such that at the time of the delegation Congress was fully ca-
pable of making precisely the policy judgments that it was delegating.4
397. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961).
398. Pub. L. No. 95-383, § 13(a), 92 Stat. 729, 737 (1978).
399. Act of Dec. 19, 1806, ch. 1, 2 Stat. 411. Similarly, as Professor Schoenbrod ac-
knowledged, even the particular statute at issue in Field v. Clark "was of no practical help
in determining" whether another country's tariffs were "reciprocally unequal."
SCHOENBROD, supra note 100, at 33-34.
400. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
402. Arguably, the closest any court had come to this issue was the district court deci-
sion in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 737 (1971), discussed supra notes 153-55
and accompanying text, upholding the President's delegated authority to impose wage and
price controls. This authority allowed the President unfettered discretion to make a policy
judgment (albeit not one that negated a congressional decision) and to exercise that dis-
cretion immediately after Congress gave it to him, in the face of precisely the same cir-
cumstances then known to Congress. Yet Congress arguably had to delegate this type of
authority, rather than exercise it itself, because to be effective it had to be exercised with-
out warning. Congress obviously lacked the ability to act with the required dispatch to
prevent businesses from responding preemptively to adjust prices in anticipation of a con-
gressional price freeze.
The Rules Enabling Acts, discussed supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text,
arguably also were different because their delegated ability to nullify conflicting proce-
dural laws did anticipate, although did not require, circumstances of which Congress was
not necessarily aware. Because this authority was part of what Congress had determined
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Rather, the Court had upheld delegations permanently to repeal or nul-
lify congressional enactments only when predicated upon a change in
conditions after the time of the delegation, thus permitting Congress to
delegate the responsibility only for determining whether a specified con-
tingency had occurred. Although these delegations often left the Presi-
dent with wide-ranging discretion,' °3 it was typically in the area of foreign
affairs or in matters for which Congress was otherwise less well suited to
make specific decisions. While the Court also had specifically upheld
Congress' power to delegate decisions that Congress itself was fully ca-
pable of making, with or without any such intervening change in circum-
stance, no such delegation had authorized the irreversible nullification
of a statutory provision, but rather had authorized only the filling of
gaps.
In contrast, the Line Item Veto Act presented the Supreme Court with
a delegation of immediately exercisable authority permanently to nullify
law. Viewed in this light, the most effective means of distinguishing the
Line Item Veto Act from its nondelegation doctrine precedents would
have been to focus not on Congress' legislative will,4°5 but on its "essen-
tial legislative function." ° Congress' decision to permit the President to
decide whether or not to cancel was problematic not because it violated
Congress' legislative will, but because it suggested that Congress simply
lacked legislative will. In the words of Judge McGowan, the Act argua-
bly was an attempt to "escape from having to stand up and be counted,"
rather than an effort "to deal with subject matter that is novel and impre-
cise, and for which [Congress] is frequently ill-equipped to do more than
to paint with a broad brush." Or, to quote Justice Cardozo, this was
"delegation running riot.'"' Each time Congress enacted a measure
subject to cancellation, Congress at that moment was able to know every
should be the Supreme Court's continuing ability to determine, at least in the first in-
stance, the rules of proceedings for lower federal courts, the authority was reversible. De-
spite their potential to render conflicting provisions of existing law of "no further force or
effect," the Rules Enabling Acts therefore are best described as an example of gap-filling
authority, rather than as an example of contingent authority.
403. Cf David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and Sepa-
ration of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOzO L. REV. 947, 976-77 (1999)
(collecting examples of delegations with great executive discretion).
404. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Wayman v. Southard, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825).
405. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,425 (1944) ("only concern of courts is to
ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed").
406. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935) (em-
phasis added); see also Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424.
407. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1128-29.
408. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
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fact relevant to the President's potential exercise of cancellation author-
ity, yet had chosen to abdicate its role.4°9 It had done so not to allow an
administrative agency (or the Supreme Court, as with the Rules Enabling
Acts) to develop a detailed record and employ its expertise to continu-
ally fine-tune the interstices of a law, but to allow the President to nullify
a law.
From this perspective, the strongest articulation of a nondelegation
doctrine challenge to the Line Item Veto Act would have been to ob-
serve that the Court had never upheld the delegation of an irreversible
power to repeal or nullify that could be exercised contemporaneously
with the delegation. In their efforts to differentiate the Court's contin-
gent legislation precedents from the Line Item Veto Act, both the City of
New York plaintiffs and the Snake River plaintiffs approached this argu-
ment, pointing out that prior delegations of the equivalent of repeal
authority had been approved only where Congress had specified the
conditions that would trigger the repeal.40 But again, the Line Item Veto
Act's defenders could respond that Congress in fact had specified such
conditions in the Act, and the debate then came down to whether these
conditions were sufficient. What was missing from the challengers' ar-
gument was a direct invitation for the Court to rule that a delegation of
authority permanently to nullify the force of laws should be invalid when
not predicated upon some change in circumstance subsequent to the
delegation.41' Rather, in invoking the nondelegation doctrine, the Act's
challengers continued to focus on whether the delegated authority fur-
thered or nullified the congressional purpose. Given the Court's permis-
sive nondelegation doctrine precedents, it was too easy to respond to this
question in the Act's favor by reference to Congress' deficit reduction
purpose, as well as by reference to the various other conditions and limits
imposed upon the cancellation authority.
Nevertheless, the Act's challengers prevailed in their effort to invali-
409. Although a similar authority arguably was at issue in Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
there Congress simply could not itself have practicably imposed wage and price controls,
as discussed infra text accompanying notes 528-29. Here, an argument about the "imprac-
ticability" of Congress itself making the decisions it had instead delegated to the President
in the Line Item Veto Act did not apply. Indeed, Congress already had specifically fo-
cused its attention on each item cancelable under the Act, and, without any loss of effec-
tiveness, could have itself determined to devote the funds to deficit reduction.
410. See City of New York Brief, supra note 310, at 42; Snake River Brief, supra note
310, at 42-44.
411. The amicus brief of Representatives Henry Waxman and colleagues came closest
to making this point in arguing that although precedents might be found for any one of the
Line Item Veto Act's challenged features, no single previous delegation had contained all
of these features. See Brief for Representatives Waxman, et al., supra note 363, at 29.
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date the Act, persuading the Supreme Court not of their secondary claim
that the Act violated the nondelegation doctrine, but of their primary ar-
gument that the Act was inconsistent with the Presentment Clause. As
explained in Part IV, however, the Supreme Court's explanation of this
result was demonstrably inferior to the preceding nondelegation doctrine
rationale available to it.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S AVOIDANCE OF THE NONDELEGATION
DOCTRINE IN CITY OF NEW YORK
In his dissenting opinion one year earlier in Raines, Justice Stevens had
conclusively opined that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional
because it violated the lawmaking processes of the Presentment Clause
of Article I.412 In City of New York, he was given the opportunity to ex-
plain this conclusion, now on behalf of a six-Justice majority that deliber-
ately avoided addressing the alternative nondelegation arguments.
Three dissenters not only found this conclusion misguided, but also
would have sustained the Act as consistent with prior delegations of
authority.
A. The Majority's Conclusion that the Line Item Veto Act Violates
Article I
After rejecting arguments that both the City of New York plaintiffs
and the Snake River plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Line Item
Veto Act,413 Justice Stevens turned to the merits of their attack on the
Act's constitutionality. At the outset, he described as "undisputed" the
fact that each of the two provisions whose cancellation was before the
Court-the Medicare reimbursement provision for New York state, and
the limited tax benefit for agricultural cooperatives that purchased proc-
essing facilities-"had been signed into law pursuant to Article I, § 7, of
the Constitution., 41 4 His analysis then proceeded to describe the Act's
processes by which the President had cancelled these provisions, and the
statutory result: that the cancellations, by definition, prevented these two
provisions "from having legal force or effect.,
415
Following this description of the Act, the opinion then proceeded im-
mediately to its determinative sentence: "In both legal and practical ef-
412. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 838 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra notes
342-44 and accompanying text.
413. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,430-36 (1998).
414. Id. at 436.
415. Id. at 436-38 (citation omitted).
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fect, the President has amended two acts of Congress by repealing a por-
tion of each., 416 Thus, the simple core of the Court's analysis was that by
preventing a measure already enacted in full compliance with Article I
from thereafter having legal force or effect, cancellation was tantamount
to a repeal.
With this perspective of the Act's operation, the Court sped on to its
inevitable conclusion. Because "'[riepeal of statutes, no less than enact-
ment, must conform with Art. I,'- 417 the Court held that the Line Item
Veto Act was unconstitutional. "What has emerged ... from the Presi-
dent's exercise of his statutory cancellation powers... are truncated ver-
sions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. 418  Without
amending the Constitution, the Act had established a new procedure for
repealing portions of statutes, 4'9 not in conformance with the "'single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered"' lawmaking procedures of
Article 1.420
En route to this conclusion, the Court briefly detoured to respond to a
straw-man argument. After stating that "no provision in the Constitu-
tion ... authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal stat-
utes, 421 the Court remarked that the Constitution also "is silent on the
subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends
parts of duly enacted statutes., 422 The Court then described "powerful
reasons for construing constitutional silence on this profoundly impor-
tant issue as equivalent to an express prohibition,, 423 including the fact
that "[o]ur first President understood the text of the Presentment Clause
as requiring that he either 'approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in
toto.' ' ' 424 Yet none of the Act's defenders had argued (as in fact some
commentators had425) that the Presentment Clause contained within it an
implicit yet unrecognized item veto power. Nor had they argued that
"constitutional silence" should be interpreted as allowing the President
unilaterally to repeal parts of a statute. Rather, the proposition that the
416. Id. at 438.
417. Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)).
418. Id. at 440.
419. See id. at 448-49.
420. Id. at 439-40 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951).
421. Id. at 438.
422. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
423. Id.
424. Id. at 440 (quoting 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1745-1799, at
96 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940); see also supra note 265.
425. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 265,84 Nw. U. L. REv. at 479.
[Vol. 49:337
2000] The Supreme Court's Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine 403
Constitution prohibited the President from unilaterally repealing enacted
laws (or portions thereof) was entirely noncontroversial. At issue in-
stead was a simple question of perspective: whether or not to view can-
cellations under the Act as unilateral repeals.
The Line Item Veto Act's defenders had defensibly argued that can-
cellations should not be classified as repeals in part because of the Act's
"lockbox" mechanism. They observed that as a result of the lockbox, "a
cancelled provision does retain real, legal budgetary effect. It removes
the [cancelled] ... amount of money[,] under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
and the Budget Enforcement Act[,] from Congress' ability to spend that
equivalent amount of money., 426 The Court rejected this argument be-
cause regardless of any lingering budgetary impact, the cancelled provi-
sions were "entirely inoperative as to appellees.... The cancellation of
one section of a statute may be the functional equivalent of a partial re-
peal even if a portion of the section is not cancelled.,
427
The Act's defenders had also argued that cancellations should not be
classified as repeals because the Court had sustained other statutes that
had delegated equivalent authority to deprive a provision of legal force
and effect. The Court sought to distinguish these precedents from the
cancellation authority of the Line Item Veto Act, focusing principally on
428Field v. Clark and related tariff statutes. It explained its view that, un-
like the Line Item Veto Act, these precedents were made "contingent
upon a condition that did not exist when the . . . Act was passed, 429 im-
posed a duty on the President to act, and involved the President in "exe-
cuting the policy that Congress had embodied in the statute. ,4° Having
concluded that the Line Item Veto Act was not akin to these nondelega-
tion doctrine precedents, the Court then emphasized that it had no occa-
sion to reach the challengers' alternative argument that even under the
nondelegation doctrine the Act lacked a sufficient intelligible principle.31
Instead, the Court wrote that "the only issue we address concerns the
'finely wrought' procedure commanded by the Constitution," and con-
426. Transcript of Oral Arg. at 10, City of New York (No. 97-1374).
427. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 441.
428. See id. at 442-46. At oral argument, the Court also had distinguished between
merely repealing the effect of a prior statute and actually repealing the statute itself, and
had suggested that the Line Item Veto Act was an example of the latter. See Transcript of
Oral Arg. at 9-10, City of New York (No. 97-1374).
429. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 443.
430. Id. at 443-44. The Court also distinguished many examples as "relat[ing] to for-
eign trade," where the President has an extra" 'degree of discretion and freedom.' " Id at
445 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
431. Id. at 447.
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cluded that the defenders' extensive discussion about Congress' ability to
delegate "does not really bear on the narrow issue that is dispositive of
these cases," namely the Presentment Clause.432
B. Weaknesses in the Court's Presentment Clause Analysis
Were the Court's Presentment Clause analysis convincing, its decision
to avoid reaching the nondelegation doctrine would be unassailable.
However, the Presentment Clause analysis contained several significant
flaws.
The Presentment Clause, one of several of the "precise rules, 433 of Ar-
ticle I, ensures that the three constitutional actors in the lawmaking pro-
cess-the House, the Senate, and the President-each have agreed to ex-
actly the same statutory text. Concededly, all three of these actors had
agreed both to the text of the Line Item Veto Act, as well as to the text
of every subsequent measure containing items subject to the Line Item
Veto Act. Precisely because the Framers had established such "a single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" for making
laws,4 4 literal compliance with this precise procedure, without more,
should have fulfilled the Framers' purpose of making sure that all three
actors each have understood and agreed to the same text before it be-
comes law. The Court itself had previously suggested as much, explain-
ing in Chadha that any subsequent presidential action pursuant to an en-
acted law is by definition executive action, which can be tested both
against the limits of the particular statutory measure, to which all three
actors have agreed, as well as by the adequacy of those limits themselves,
evaluated under the nondelegation doctrine:
When the Attorney General performs his duties pursuant to [a
statute], he does not exercise 'legislative' power .... The bi-
cameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's
administration of the laws because his administrative activity
cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a
statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7 .3S
The Chadha opinion then explained that the constitutionality of execu-
tive action pursuant to a validly enacted statute "involves only a question
of delegation doctrine," not of compliance with Article 1.43
432. See id. at 447-48.
433. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 728, 757 (1996).
434. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
435. Id. at 953 n.16 (citation omitted).
436. Id. Justice White, in dissent, reinforced this principle by observing that "Art. I
does not require all action with the effect of legislation to be passed as law." Id. at 985
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The Line Item Veto Act presented precisely this question. Accord-
ingly, for purposes of the Supreme Court's Article I analysis of the Line
Item Veto Act, the Act's literal compliance with the Presentment Clause
should have sufficed. Nevertheless, in City of New York the Court felt
compelled to require more than literal compliance with Article I. After
having acknowledged that the terms of the Presentment Clause had been
strictly followed when the two cancelled measures were enacted,437 the
Court could find a Presentment Clause violation only by then identifying
some post-enactment action as inconsistent with the spirit of the Article I
lawmaking requirements. The only possibility was to describe a cancella-
tion as a unilateral repeal. Yet the Court's equation of a cancellation
under the Act with a statutory repeal was essentially an unsupportable
ipse dixit.438
For several reasons, cancellations were not best viewed as the func-
tional equivalent of a repeal. First, the text of a repealed provision is no
longer "on the books." Presumably with this in mind, the Court's opin-
ion therefore asserted that the "critical difference" between the Line
Item Veto Act and other delegations of nullification authority was that
cancellations under the Act "change the text of duly enacted statutes." '439
Yet, this simply was not true. The Act did not empower the President to
excise words from the Statutes-at-Large. Rather, like numerous prior
delegations,' it only authorized him to change the effect of an enacted
law. For instance, cancellation of the Medicare reimbursement provision
for New York State did not mean that any part of the provision's text
had been changed or repealed. It simply meant that the President had
declared, pursuant to his authority, that the provision would no longer
entitle New York to reimbursement, and that instead the enacted provi-
sion would be used for deficit reduction. As Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices O'Connor and Scalia, wrote in his dissent, "[w]hen the President
'cancelled' the two appropriation measures now before us, he did not
repeal any law nor did he amend any law. He simply followed the law,
leaving the statutes, as they are literally written, intact.""' 1
Nothing about the Act's cancellation processes resulted in any textual
change to enacted laws, any more than the actual statutory text of the
rules of court procedure was changed whenever the Supreme Court
(White, J., dissenting).
437. See City of New York, 524 U.S. at 436.
438. For similar critiques of the reasoning that sustains the majority opinion, see
Garrett, supra note 21, at 885-91, and Powell & Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 1174-89.
439. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 446-47.
440. See supra part I.A.
441. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 474 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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promulgated inconsistent rules pursuant to the Rules Enabling Acts.
The Court attempted to distinguish the Rules Enabling Acts on the basis
that in those Acts "Congress itself made the decision to repeal prior rules
upon the occurrence of a particular event-here, the promulgation of
procedural rules by this Court.""' 2 Yet no less could it have been said
with respect to the Line Item Veto Act that Congress itself had made the
decision to repeal particular spending items, also contingent upon the oc-
currence of a particular event, namely the cancellation of those items by
the President. Under this view, the Act merely established a new default
rule making certain items of federal spending now optional. It is hard to
imagine the Court striking down as violating the Presentment Clause a
statute that appropriated x dollars, either for purpose z or, if the Presi-
dent notified Congress, for deficit reduction.
In addition, a true repeal, no matter how partial, would have rendered
the repealed element inoperative for all purposes. That is not the best
description of the effect of a cancellation under the Act. The Act's lock-
box feature necessarily meant-indeed, this was the purpose of the
Act-that enacted provisions which the President cancelled did continue
to have binding legal effect.443 The Court's opinion essentially admitted
this, yet nevertheless baldly asserted that "[s]uch significant changes do
not lose their character [as functionally equivalent to a partial repeal]
simply because the cancelled provisions may have some continuing fi-
nancial effect on the Government," 4" an effect that they could not have
had were they actually repealed (or never enacted).
Finally, cancellations under the Act were no more "repeals" than were
a multitude of precedents. For instance, the executive branch's exercise
of statutory authority to create exemptions in provisions of federal law
also renders those provisions "entirely inoperative" with respect to the
exempt class, yet the Court had not previously treated exemption
445 446
authority, or countless other analogous delegated powers, 4 as equiva
lent to a true repeal. As Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Breyer, observed in his dissent, while it may have been arguable "as an
original matter" that the Presentment Clause should be applied to pro-
442. Id. at 446 n.40.
443. Unfortunately, the parties struggled with various degrees of misunderstanding of
the lockbox effect. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Arg. at 49-51, Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417 (1998) (No. 97-1374); City of New York, 524 U.S. at 440-41 & n.32.
444. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 441.
445. See, e.g, Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476, 486-89 (1914) (upholding ICC
authority to exempt rail carriers from provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act).
446. See, e.g., examples discussed supra notes 30-37, 117-23 and accompanying text
(describing examples of approved delegations).
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hibit the delegation of authority to nullify a law, "that argument has long
since been made and rejected."' 7 Nevertheless, with respect to the two
cancelled provisions at issue in City of New York, the Court treated a
cancellation as equivalent to a genuine repeal because the cancelled pro-
vision was "entirely inoperative" as to its specific beneficiary." Al-
though this statement provides no basis for distinguishing the impact of a
cancellation under the Act from the impact of countless other previous
executive nullifications of existing law, the Court chose to treat cancella-
tion alone as equivalent to repeal.
Justice Stevens had once observed, in a concurring opinion in Bowsher
v. Synar,"9 that "governmental power cannot always be readily charac-
terized with only one... label[]. ''4"° But in City of New York, the Court
was quick to characterize the power at issue in the Line Item Veto Act as
a legislative authority to repeal, despite sound reasons alternatively to la-
bel it as an (albeit sweeping) executive authority. For purposes of Article
I, therefore, the Court had found no supportable basis for its premise
that the Act's cancellation authority effectively authorized the President
unilaterally to repeal or amend statutes. While purporting to distinguish
the Act from prior delegated authorities to change the effect of laws, the
Court ultimately could sustain its premise that the Line Item Veto Act
amounted to an unprecedented power to repeal only because the Court
had chosen to so label it.
C. Two Dissenting Views of the Act's Constitutionality
In two separate dissenting opinions, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Breyer criticized the majority's Article I analysis. All three Justices
joined both in Justice Breyer's expression that "one cannot say that the
President's exercise of the power the Act grants is, literally speaking, a
'repeal' or 'amendment,' 45 ' as well as in Justice Scalia's observation that
"[a]s much as the Court goes on about Art. I, § 7.... that provision does
not demand the result the Court reaches., 452 Instead, the dissenting Jus-
tices explained that the dispositive issue was whether the Line Item Veto
Act conformed with the nondelegation doctrine, and argued that the
447. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 464 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the argument to this effect
made by dissenting Justices in Field v. Clark).
448. See City of New York, 524 U.S. at 441.
449. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
450. Id. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring).
451. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 479 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
452. Id. at 464 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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majority's proffered distinctions between the Act and the delegations
sustained in cases such as Field v. Clark merely confirmed this:
These distinctions have nothing to do with whether the details
of Art. I, § 7 have been complied with, but everything to do
with whether the authorizations went too far by transferring to
the Executive a degree of political, lawmaking power that our
traditions demand be retained by the legislative branch.4 3
Each of the two dissenting opinions then went on to explain why these
three Justices would have upheld the Act, or at least portions of it, on
nondelegation doctrine grounds.
For Justice Breyer, this first required considering what he described as
two other separation-of-powers issues: whether Congress had "given the
President the wrong kind of power, i.e., 'Non-Executive' power," and
whether Congress had "given the President the power to 'encroach' upon
Congress' own constitutionally reserved territory., 454 Only thereafter did
he address the nondelegation doctrine, which he described as "an added
constitutional check upon Congress' authority to delegate power to the
Executive Branch., 455 Yet even in the analysis of his first two separation-
of-powers questions, nondelegation doctrine precedents figured promi-
nently in his view of the Line Item Veto Act's constitutionality, just as
the Act's supporters had hoped they would.
With respect to the first question, Justice Breyer asserted that the
Act's cancellation power is executive because "an exercise of that power
'executes' the Act.... The fact that one could also characterize this kind
of power as 'legislative,' . . . is beside the point., 456 He explained that
many government powers admitted labeling as both legislative and ex-
ecutive, and described several such delegated powers that the Court had
sustained.457 He then described the Line Item Veto Act's cancellation
power as "far easier conceptually to reconcile ... with the relevant con-
stitutional description ('executive') than in many of these cases.','8
Justice Breyer next disposed of his second separation-of-powers ques-
tion, concluding that the Line Item Veto Act had neither encroached
upon congressional power nor aggrandized executive power. Because
Congress was always free to exempt any provision from the operation of
the Line Item Veto Act, and more generally to draft in whatever way it
453. Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
454. Id. at 480 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
455. Id. at 484 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
456. Id. at 480 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
457. See id. at 480-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
458. Id. at 481 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
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chose those provisions that would be subject to the Act's cancellation
power, he concluded that Congress always retained the power to "de-
fine[] the outer limits of the President's cancellation authority., 459 He
also noted that while the power to spend or not spend (or to permit or
not permit limited tax benefits to have effect) "may strengthen the Presi-
dency.... any such change in Executive Branch authority seems minute
when compared with the changes worked by delegations of other kinds
of authority that the Court in the past has upheld." '
Justice Breyer then turned his attention to the final separation-of-
powers issue, engaging in a full-dress analysis of the Act's validity under
the nondelegation doctrine. Stating that this doctrine posed "a more se-
rious constitutional obstacle" to the Act, he began searching for an "in-
telligible principle" sufficient to uphold it.41 He described the Act as
"seek[ing] to create such a principle in three ways":42 procedurally, in
terms of the considerations that the Act required the President to take
into account in selecting items for cancellation; purposively, in terms of
eliminating wasteful spending and promoting fiscal accountability in the
government; and substantively, in terms of the required determinations
that cancellation reduce the deficit, not impair essential government
functions, and not harm the national interest.463
Despite the evident breadth of these standards, Justice Breyer con-
cluded that "(a) the broadly phrased limitations in the Act, together with
(b) its evident deficit reduction purpose, and (c) a procedure that guaran-
tees Presidential awareness of the reasons for including a particular pro-
vision in a budget bill, taken together," provided a constitutionally suffi-
cient guide for the delegated authority. 46 In particular, he explained that
the Line Item Veto Act compared favorably with other nondelegation
cases. Like the authority upheld in National Broadcasting Company v.
United States465 to regulate broadcast licenses as the "public interest, con-
venience, or necessity" require, and unlike the authority struck down in
Schechter Poultry to regulate the entire economy, 6 the Act was "aimed
459. Id. at 482 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Neal E. Devins, supra note 324, at 1624
("Congress can easily blunt this power by specifying appropriations priorities through un-
official and informal documents, by bundling disparate programs into a single item, and by
financing programs indirectly through nonappropriation bills.").
460. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 483 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
461. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
462. Id. at 484 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
463. See id. at 484-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
464. Id. at 486 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
465. National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,225-26 (1943).
466. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935); see
Catholic University Law Review
at a discrete problem," namely wasteful spending among a particular
subset of federal expenditures.467 Furthermore, the power given to the
President to determine whether or not to spend a particular amount
"does not readily lend itself to a more specific standard," and was "'suffi-
ciently definite and precise to enable ... the public to ascertain ... con-
form[ity]'." Justice Breyer also noted that numerous delegations to the
President since the first Congress of authority to spend or not spend ap-
propriated sums meant that the Act's power to cancel dollar amounts of
discretionary budget authority and items of new direct spending occurred
in "an area where history helps to justify," as well as to provide guiding
context for, the Act's delegated authority.469
He acknowledged greater difficulty with respect to the Act's authority
to cancel limited tax benefits, but ultimately reached the same conclu-
sion, partly on the strength of the Court's precedent that "'the delegation
of discretionary authority under Congress' taxing power is subject to no
constitutional scrutiny greater than that we have applied to other non-
delegation challenges.' ' 470 Justice Breyer also concluded that Field v.
Clark and J.W. Hampton "resemble today's Act more closely than one
might at first suspect" because they also involved revenue-raising meas-
ures with vague delegated standards. 471 He then rebutted the majority's
attempt to distinguish Field v. Clark and related examples. Contrary to
the majority's claims, he explained that not all these examples imposed a
"duty" on the President, but often left him with substantial discretion;
that delegations of taxing authority have not been limited to matters of
foreign affairs; and that, in fact, it could fairly be said of the Line Item
Veto Act that the President was executing, not rejecting, congressional
policy.72 Thus, while observing that the Act "skirts a constitutional
edge," Justice Breyer nevertheless concluded that it should have been
also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
467. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 487 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
468. Id. at 487-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
426 (1944)); see also Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904) ("Congress legislated
... as far as was reasonably practicable"); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S.
90, 105 (1946) (noting that detailed rules are not required where "impracticable"); supra
notes 67 & 133 and accompanying text.
469. See City of New York, 524 U.S. at 488 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
470. Id. at 492 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.,
490 U.S. 212, 221-23 (1989)); see also supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
471. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 492-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
472. See id. at 493-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Epstein & O'Halloran, supra
note 403, at 948 (describing the majority opinion as ignoring many delegations of "real
policy making discretion").
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upheld in its entirety.
For Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, the issue was easier be-
cause of their conclusion that the Snake River plaintiffs lacked standing
to challenge the cancellation of a limited tax benefit provision whose ad-
vantage would have accrued directly to a third party, rather than to the
Snake River plaintiffs.4  As a result, Justice Scalia did not reach the con-
stitutionality of the Act's delegation of authority to cancel limited tax
benefits, and addressed only the constitutionality of the Act's delegated
authority to cancel new direct spending, the issue raised by the City of
New York plaintiffs. After also concluding that the Presentment Clause
had no bearing on this issue, Justice Scalia explained that the Act's
authority to cancel spending should be tested against the limits on
Congress' ability to authorize "Executive reduction or augmentation" of
congressional enactments,475 limits established "by what has come to be
known as the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority.
4 76
Justice Scalia based his analysis of this issue largely upon Congress'
historical practice "since the Founding of the Nation" of "authorizing
money to be spent on a particular item at the President's discretion.
' 477
He identified both the budgetary tool of lump-sum appropriations, initi-
ated in the first Congress, as well as abundant historical examples, ap-
proved of in Cincinnati Soap,78 of making specific appropriations subject
to the discretion of the President.79 Echoing Cincinnati Soap, he ob-
served that "[t]he constitutionality of such appropriations has never seri-
ously been questioned." Given the historically shared responsibilities
of Congress and the President for controlling federal spending, Justice
Scalia concluded that "[i]nsofar as the degree of political, 'law-making'
power conferred upon the Executive is concerned, there is not a dime's
worth of difference between Congress' authorizing the President to can-
cel a spending item, and Congress' authorizing money to be spent on a
particular item at the President's discretion."' '
Justice Scalia also noted that "the Line Item Veto Act is not the first
473. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 496-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
474. See id. at 456-63 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
475. Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
476. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
477. Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
478. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
479. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 466-67 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
480. Id. at 467 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
481. Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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statute to authorize the President to 'cancel' spending items," but that
the sequestration authority of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act also
had provided that amounts sequestered by the President "'shall be per-
manently cancelled."'' In 1986, then-Judge Scalia had upheld this
authority, while invalidating the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act on other
483grounds. He likewise would have upheld the Line Item Veto Act's
authority to cancel items of direct spending (and presumably its authority
to cancel appropriation items as well), finding this authority "no different
from what Congress has permitted the President to do since the forma-
tion of the Union."
Most interesting about Justice Scalia's dissent was that, unlike Justice
Breyer, he found no need even to consider whether the Act's particular
delegation of authority over spending contained a sufficient "intelligible
principle." Instead, while Justice Breyer was relying upon the combina-
tion of a host of congressionally specified conditions to conclude that
each of the Act's three types of cancellation authority was sufficiently
constrained, Justice Scalia found an alternative basis to uphold just the
Act's two types of spending cancellation authority, without reaching its
authority to cancel limited tax benefits. His view seemed to be that
where the simple expenditure of appropriated funds for lawful purposes
was concerned, Congress could grant the President complete and un-
guided discretion over whether and how much to spend. In essence, this
was a view that executive control over spending fell within one of those
"categories of administrative decisions that courts traditionally have re-
garded as 'committed to agency discretion.' 485 Thus, while explaining
that the Act's delegated authority to cancel spending items should be
tested under the nondelegation doctrine, Justice Scalia also was suggest-
ing that for some categories of delegations, Congress need not even
specify an intelligible principle. At least in his and Justice O'Connor's
view, delegation concerning federal spending apparently was once such
category.
482. Id. at 465-66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. § 902(a)(4)).
483. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
484. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 469 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
485. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U.S. 788, 817 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). The
Department of Justice had made exactly this argument as part of its defense of the Act,
relying upon Congress' ability to make lump-sum appropriations to argue that "no consti-
tutional infirmity would exist" in precisely such an unlimited discretionary authority over
spending. See DOJ Brief, supra note 265, at 45-46.
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D. Explaining the Decision
In determining that the Line Item Veto Act effectively had given the
President unprecedented and unconstitutional authority to make (or
unmake) law, the majority in City of New York relied solely upon the
Presentment Clause. Yet for over one hundred years, the nondelegation
doctrine had existed, at least in theory, to assist courts in making pre-
cisely such a determination, by distinguishing between those impermissi-
ble delegations of "power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be," and those permissible delegations of
"authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law." ' This doctrine, therefore, would have seemed an
ideal basis for evaluating (and also, at least for a Court willing to put
some teeth back into the doctrine, for invalidating) the Line Item Veto
Act. Why then did the six-Justice majority in City of New York choose
to analyze the Act under the procedures of Article I instead?
One possible answer, of course, is that the Presentment Clause pro-
vided a better tool of analysis. But as discussed above, 4 the Present-
ment Clause analysis was seriously compromised, because the President's
exercise of the Act's cancellation authority did not in fact literally repeal
the provisions at issue. And as also previously discussed, the Supreme
Court in Chadha had declared that the constitutionality of congressional
delegations of executive authority would involve "only a question of
delegation doctrine," not of whether the Presentment Clause had been
violated.4 Yet, in City of New York the Court chose to require more
than literal compliance with the terms of Article I, adding a new gloss on
the Presentment Clause that in fact was inconsistent with a number of
precedents that had approved analogous powers effectively to repeal ex-
isting provisions.49
A related answer might be, as Justice Scalia wrote, that "[t]he title of
486. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,693-94 (1892).
487. See supra Part IV.B.
488. INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983); see also supra notes 434-36 and ac-
companying text.
489. A potential factor in reaching this result may have been the fact that in his dissent
in Raines one year earlier, Justice Stevens had concluded that the congressional plaintiffs
there did have standing on the simple force of the argument that the Line Item Veto Act
had changed the dynamic of the legislative process in such a way as to deprive Members of
Congress of their Article I powers. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 835-36 (1997) (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting). Having then gone on to opine that for the identical reason the Act was
unconstitutional, see id., it would be natural for him in City of New York to seek to per-
suade his colleagues now to join him in his view that Article I provided the correct ration-
ale for invalidating the Act.
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the Line Item Veto Act . . . has succeeded in faking out the Supreme
Court.' '490 Yet even if not literally "faked out" by the Act's title, the
Court essentially may have decided to take Congress at its word, holding
Congress accountable for what it was purporting to do, regardless of the
technicalities of how it did so. And to the extent that the Court per-
ceived the Act's cancellation power as essentially identical to a true item
veto power-a power widely acknowledged Congress could not grant by
statute because it would violate the lawmaking requirements of
Article/4 1-the Act's title could only reinforce the Court's visceral feel-
ing that the Act somehow ran afoul of the Presentment Clause. This ex-
planation would suggest that the Court's ruling was more impressionistic
than analytic, however, assessing the statute at the level of its purpose
rather than its textual meaning. Such an explanation would mark a de-
parture from what some commentators had seen as the recent Court's
formalism, "central to the rationale of Chadha and Bowsher," in which
everything "after the formal Article I lawmaking process is concluded"
492was treated as an Article II executive power.
Another possible answer is that the Court may have believed that, had
it reached the nondelegation doctrine issue, it would have had difficulty
striking down the Act. This, of course, was why the Act's defenders
hoped the Court would analyze the Act under the nondelegation doc-
trine. Given the Court's disdain for the Line Item Veto Act, perhaps it
was persuaded that analyzing the Act under the "moribund" nondelega-
tion doctrine would have complicated, or even compromised, its ability
to strike down the Act. After all, as the dissenters, particularly Justice
Breyer,93 forcefully observed, the Court ultimately did fail to come fully
to terms with the nondelegation doctrine precedents that supported the
Act.
490. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 469 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Scalia suggested that the title "was perhaps designed to simplify [the Act]
for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to comply with the terms of a campaign
pledge .. " Id.; see also Garrett, supra note 21, at 872-73, 885 (arguing that the Act's title
"misled" the Court and resulted in an "incomplete understanding" of the Act).
491. See supra note 265 and accompanying text,
492. Cynthia R. Farina, The "Chief Executive" and the Quiet Constitutional Revolu-
tion, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 181-82 (1997); see also Powell & Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at
1184 (describing Chadha as embodying "an adherence to formal processes"); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 493-94 (1987) (de-
scribing the recent reemergence of "constitutional formalism" in cases such as Chadha and
Bowsher); cf Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987) (discussing various
inconsistent approaches to separation-of-powers questions taken by the Supreme Court).
493. See supra notes 461-73 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, precisely because the Court had not fully distinguished
these precedents, it may have feared that reviving the nondelegation doc-
trine to invalidate the Line Item Veto Act would have opened the flood
gates for countless other challenges to a variety of accepted delegations
of administrative authority. Perhaps the Court agreed with Professor Pe-
ter Schuck that the problem of how to draw lines between permissible
and impermissible delegations was "insuperable. '' 94 In other words,
were the Court to hold that the Act's delegated authority to cancel items
of spending lacked a sufficient intelligible principle, the Court might
eventually find itself hard-pressed not to strike down, for instance, such
time-tested and accepted delegations of authority as the FCC's power to
regulate the airwaves for "the public convenience, interest, or neces-
sity. '495 Indeed, an exchange at the oral argument in City of New York
had suggested that some Justices did not see much difference between
the FCC standard and the constraints upon the Line Item Veto Act.49
Thus, rather than tackle the line-drawing problem of how to invest new
life in the nondelegation doctrine without unleashing a parade of horri-
bles, the Court may have found in the Presentment Clause an attractive
alternative that, regardless of its own shortcomings, would at least allow
the Court to avoid the nondelegation doctrine altogether.4W
Of course, this would suggest that the Court was persuaded not to re-
suscitate a strong form of the nondelegation doctrine, and may instead
have desired to preserve its ability to continue to condone many congres-
sional delegations of authority. 98 Nevertheless, as argued above,4 9 the
Court also avoided the opportunity to develop a refined nondelegation
doctrine--consistent with its precedents and without unleashing an ava-
lanche of challenges to a variety of delegations of regulatory and other
executive authorities-by which it could narrowly have struck down the
Line Item Veto Act. Indeed, if nothing else, the Court's proffered dis-
494. Peter H. Schuck, supra note 148, at 791.
495. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279
(1933).
496. See Transcript of Oral Arg. at 27-28, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998) (No. 97-1374).
497. Indeed, some concern that its decision not be interpreted as involving the non-
delegation doctrine plainly is evident in the Court's emphasis at the end of its opinion that
it had found this doctrine "unnecessary" to its decision. See City of New York, 524 U.S. at
447-48.
498. Cf Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 280 (1998) (stating that "all actors understand the
deep truth that the Court would not dare disrupt the deeply entrenched features of the
post-New Deal order[,]" including extensive administrative delegations).
499. See supra notes 402-411 and accompanying text.
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tinctions for entirely avoiding the nondelegation doctrine precedents °
could also have been proffered just as easily in order to reach a different
result under the doctrine.
In the author's view, the Court, rather than relying on the Presentment
Clause, should have invalidated the Act by holding that a delegation of
authority permanently to nullify the force of laws violates the nondelega-
tion doctrine unless the authority is predicated upon a specified subse-
quent change in circumstance. The Court thereby could readily have
shown some inclination not to give up on the nondelegation doctrine,
without threatening the heart of the modem administrative state. The
Act therefore presented the Court with a manageable way to demon-
strate that the doctrine still had some content, had the Court desired to
do so.
V. RESULTING PERSPECTIVES ON PRINCIPLES OF NONDELEGATION
The Supreme Court's approach to the Line Item Veto Act allows us to
draw at least five interrelated conclusions about the content and vitality
of the nondelegation doctrine. First, the opinion establishes that, inde-
pendent of the nondelegation doctrine, an alternative nondelegation
principle inheres in Article I itself. Second, this alternative has the po-
tential to swallow the nondelegation doctrine, at least in theory if un-
likely in practice, and in any event threatens eventually to put the Court
to the hard question that it has so far avoided of defining precisely what
is nondelegable legislative power. Third, the majority's approach sug-
gests that for the time being the Court nevertheless remains committed
to a lenient nondelegation doctrine, under which it has little intention of
radically transforming today's accepted forms of administrative delega-
tion. Fourth, the Court's decision meanwhile sheds light upon the type
of future case, if any, likely to convince the Court to reinvigorate the
nondelegation doctrine. Finally, Justice Scalia's opinion, although a dis-
sent, augurs the possibility that, at least where less flagrant efforts to cir-
cumvent the Presentment Clause are at issue, the Court may find reason
to give at least some delegations of spending discretion a still wider berth
than it would even under today's permissive nondelegation doctrine.
A. The Presentment Clause as a New-Found Limit Upon Permissible
Delegations
Historically, the nondelegation doctrine has not been the only judicial
constraint upon Congress' ability to delegate its powers. Over the years,
500. See supra notes 428-32 and accompanying text.
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principles of unconstitutional vagueness, as well as due process, also have
occasionally been invoked to preclude Congress from effectively abdi-
cating its legislative responsibility. For instance, in United States v. L.
Cohen Grocery Co.,"' the Court struck down a 1919 statute that crimi-
nalized the making of "any unjust or unreasonable rate ' ' for certain
goods, on the basis that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and
"forbids no specific or definite act."5 °3 Without explicitly invoking the
nondelegation doctrine, the Court reflected that to uphold such a stan-
dardless criminal provision would have been tantamount to declaring
"that [Congress] was competent to delegate legislative power, in the very
teeth of the settled significance of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and
of other plainly applicable provisions of the Constitution.
' 04
Thus, in City of New York, the Snake River plaintiffs had argued that
the nondelegation doctrine "is only an instance" of the "'fundamental
precept . . . that the lawmaking function belongs to Congress."'05 In
striking down the Line Item Veto Act, the Supreme Court effectively
agreed, in the process creating yet another application of this fundamen-
tal precept. It found that impermissible abdications of lawmaking pow-
ers to the executive branch could occur not only through direct violations
of the nondelegation doctrine, but now also through circumvention of
the Presentment Clause of Article I.
The Supreme Court had foreshadowed the possibility that the re-
501. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
502. Id. at 89.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 92. Professor Schoenbrod describes this case as an ignored third instance of
the Court striking down a statute on the ground that it delegated legislative power. See
SCHOENBROD, supra note 100, at 34-35 & n.28. For other "void for vagueness" examples,
see Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974), and Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 168-70 (1972).
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), the Court invalidated on due
process grounds a Civil Service Commission regulation barring resident aliens from fed-
eral employment. Although the Commission defended its regulation on the basis of its
authority "to establish standards with respect to citizenship" for admission to the civil
service, the Court concluded that the interests the Commission argued were served by its
regulation (such as facilitating the President's negotiation of treaties) were outside of the
Commission's proper domain. See id. at 104-05, 111-12 (citation omitted). The Court thus
concluded that, given Congress' determination to admit the aliens to residency status, the
Commission could not deprive them of their liberty interest in federal employment oppor-
tunities, except upon reasons "which are properly the concern of" the Commission. Id. at
116. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist observed that the Court had not previously grafted a
due process requirement upon an agency's exercise of delegated authority. See id. at 122
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
505. Snake River Brief, supra note 310, at 39 (quoting Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748, 758 (1996)).
Catholic University Law Review
quirements of Article I could themselves operate as an independent
nondelegation principle. In particular, when the Court in Chadha relied
upon the Presentment Clause to invalidate the one-house veto, it did so
essentially on the basis that the legislative veto mechanism was an at-
tempt to delegate to each House the independent power to make law.5°
Similarly, Justice Scalia opined a few years ago, as part of the contempo-
rary debate about textualism in statutory interpretation, that the law-
making requirements of Article I precluded Congress from delegating to
its committees the responsibility to develop the details of its enactments
through legislative history.5°7
Yet a recent article by John Manning, prior to City of New York, de-
scribing Chadha and Bowsher suggests that Article I's primary role in
constraining delegations had been to limit the practice of "self-
delegation," or Congress' effort to give itself or its agents lawmaking
powers to be exercised not in conformance with the Presentment
Clause.5° Indeed, after asserting that "for Chadha to make sense in light
of the modern realities of agency lawmaking, there must be more to it
than meets the eye," Professor Manning explains Chadha's "subtler and
more precise constitutional message": Congress cannot both "delegate
power and retain control over the delegatee."'  Article I's "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure, '  more than the tradi-
tional nondelegation doctrine, is better suited to prevent this type of self-
delegation (which Professor Manning's article addresses primarily in the
form of the practice of empowering congressional committees to create
legislative histories51 ). The problem with using the traditional nondele-
gation doctrine in this area is that it makes little sense to ask whether
Congress has established a sufficient intelligible principle to constrain it-
self.
The decision in City of New York therefore marks a dramatic change.
The Court has now employed the procedures of Article I not just to test
506. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-56 (1983); id. at 986-89 (White, J., dissent-
ing); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 498, at 280;.Manning, supra note 187, at 717; Schoenbrod,
supra note 145, at 1226 n.15; Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Re-
flections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221,
1238 (1995).
507. See Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).
508. See Manning, supra note 187, at 706-737; see also Powell & Rubenfeld, supra note
18, at 1205-06 (arguing that "formalist separation of powers vigilance" should be em-
ployed only to limit Congress' efforts to give itself power, as in Chadha and Bowsher).
509. See Manning, supra note 187, at 716-17 (citations omitted).
510. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
511. See Manning, supra note 187, at 675,710-19.
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delegations to congressional actors, but also to test delegations to other
branches. Previously, Article I's only constraint upon the executive
branch was to prohibit it from taking action without congressional
authorization, as discussed most famously in The Steel Seizure Case."2 In
light of City of New York, the concrete potential now also exists for
regularly employing the precise procedures of Article I to test a variety
of executive actions that occur pursuant to congressionally delegated
authority.
The obvious questions become: in what other circumstances will the
Court use the technical lawmaking requirements of Article I to invalidate
a delegation to the executive branch of essentially legislative authority;
and whether Article I may even become a "backdoor" '513 to strike down a
wide array of delegations that have survived challenge under the lenient
standards of the nondelegation doctrine. Although the next section sug-
gests that, at least in the short-run, this Court seems willing to continue
to permit sweeping delegations, in the long-run these issues may ulti-
mately devolve to the question of what other delegations the Court will
perceive as sufficiently "law-making" to deprive them of the lenient
treatment they otherwise would receive under the nondelegation doc-
trine.
How the Court will answer this last question is not clear.1 4 To date,
the Court has largely managed to avoid directly confronting whether or
not a particular delegated authority was "legislative," and instead has es-
sentially finessed this issue by using as a proxy whether Congress has es-
tablished a sufficient "intelligible principle" to guide the delegatee. But
in light of City of New York, it now seems more likely that the Court
eventually will need to answer this question, as the Court's basis for in-
validating the Line Item Veto Act, if carried to its logical conclusion,
would imply that truly legislative authority can never be delegated. Af-
ter all, the Court justified its decision primarily on the basis that "[tlhere
is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact,
512. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952).
513. Cf Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 124 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining, in objecting to using due process to test otherwise proper delegation, that
the fact of delegation "does not provide a back door through which to attack a policy
which would otherwise have been immune from attack").
514. For instance, long before City of New York, Justice Scalia had made clear his
views that while legislative power is absolutely nondelegable, "a certain degree of ...
lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action," Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and that congressional assignment of responsi-
bility for such action generally is "no delegation at all," Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 777 (1986) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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to amend, or to repeal statutes." '515 With this as its determinative prem-
ise, the Court's rationale for invalidating the Line Item Veto Act could
be used to invalidate as many other delegations as the Court is willing to
describe as authorizing the "amendment" of a statute. Yet as Justice
Scalia pointed out, many heretofore accepted delegations could, as an
original matter, just as easily have been described as violating Article I.516
City of New York therefore may eventually force the Court to confront
head-on the issue, left unresolved since Field v. Clark,517 of what amounts
to nondelegable legislative authority. Thus, to the extent that the Court
avoided the nondelegation doctrine in City of New York out of a fear
about how to draw clearer lines between permissible and impermissible
delegations,"' it may only have succeeded in postponing its day of reck-
oning.
B. The Persistence of An Otherwise Permissive Nondelegation Doctrine
At least in the short term, however, the decision in City of New York is
not likely to lead to a widespread judicial reassessment of the administra-
tive state. On the contrary, the Supreme Court's choice to rely upon the
Presentment Clause to invalidate what it saw as an unconstitutional dele-
gation of lawmaking authority ironically may have further entrenched
today's permissive nondelegation doctrine, as the decision suggests that
the Court as a body may not have been interested in revitalizing even a
more subtle and nuanced form of the doctrine. Had sufficient members
of the Court been interested in doing so, they could easily have found
that the nondelegation doctrine, more than the Presentment Clause,
spoke directly to the purpose of ensuring that Congress not voluntarily
give away a nondelegable "lawmaking" power. For a Court interested in
breathing new life into the nondelegation doctrine, or even just into a
more discriminating version of it, the Line Item Veto Act provided a
choice opportunity to do so.
Of course, one wrinkle in this analysis is the possibility that some
members of the City of New York majority were interested in reinvigor-
ating some form of the nondelegation doctrine, while others were not,
and that avoiding the doctrine altogether was part of a compromise posi-
tion on which the six Justices who desired to strike down the Act could
515. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,438 (1998).
516. See City of New York, 524 U.S. at 464 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
517. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
518. See supra notes 494-500 and accompanying text.
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agree.519 In particular, if three or four members of the majority did desire
to reinvigorate the doctrine, but could not persuade more of their col-
leagues, and if at the same time one or both of dissenting Justices Scalia
and O'Connor were unpersuadable not out of any generalized opposition
to a vigorous nondelegation doctrine, but only because they concluded
that, where spending authority alone was concerned, Congress should
have special latitude to delegate,2 then, in a future case not involving
spending authority, these Justices could realign themselves to revive the
nondelegation doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court's explicit reminder
at the conclusion of City of New York that it had not reached the non-
delegation doctrine 21 could suggest that the Court wanted to leave itself
free to invoke the nondelegation doctrine in the future to invalidate
some other delegated executive authority.
Given this possibility, the Court's treatment of the Line Item Veto Act
may still provide some sense of the sort of delegation that the Court
might find most vulnerable under a reinvigorated nondelegation doc-
trine. Especially at risk would be delegations that, like the authority of
the Line Item Veto Act, were not predicated on changed circumstances,
imposed no duty to act in any particular fashion, and did not otherwise
convincingly demonstrate that the executive action was advancing a par-
ticular congressional policy. These were all factors that the Court in City
of New York relied upon, even if incorrectly, to distinguish the Line Item
Veto Act from previous delegations in order to avoid analyzing it under
the doctrine.5 22 These same factors therefore are likely to be important
features, especially in combination, of some future delegation that the
Court might choose to strike down under the nondelegation doctrine.
Nevertheless, discounting the possibility that a hidden majority stands
ready to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine in a future case, the
Court as a body has now shown even greater reluctance to do so than
ever before. Furthermore, it also seems unlikely that this Court will use
City of New York to begin the widespread Article I reexamination of
administrative delegations that its rationale could theoretically justify. In
519. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17, 20-21
(1996) (identifying the "difficulty of achieving consensus among six diverse Justices" as a
possible cause of theoretical weaknesses in Romer v.Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and de-
scribing the Court's use of "incomplete theories" and "modest rationales" to resolve cases
in which not all Justices can agree on a complete theory).
520. See supra notes 477-85 and accompanying text. In contrast, Justice Breyer's dis-
sent made clear his satisfaction with an impotent nondelegation doctrine. See supra notes
464-73 and accompanying text.
521. See City of New York, 524 U.S. at 447-48.
522. See id. at 442-47; supra notes 429-30 and accompanying text.
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particular, to the extent that this Court was concerned that a reinvigor-
ated nondelegation doctrine would threaten a variety of delegated rule-
making authorities, such as that given to the FCC,23 it also would not be
likely to view the delegation of such authority as conveying a nondelega-
ble legislative power, in violation of the Presentment Clause. As a result,
delegations of what are accurately describable as interstitial rulemaking
authorities to complete the law, including the EPA's authority to establish
national ambient air quality standards at issue in American Trucking,24
are likely to remain safe.
In contrast, some delegations of what are better described as contin-
gent authority to alter the law may become more vulnerable, especially if
the Court is not satisfied with Congress' reasons for giving away this
power. Delegations of irreversible authority seem particularly at risk, al-
though where spending alone is concerned, such irreversible authority as
the 1969 spending ceilings52. or the sequestration authority of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act 6 may involve unique considerations, as
described below. 27 But the primary risk to such delegations is not that
the Court will find them to have violated the nondelegation doctrine.
Rather, it is that the Court may now come to view them as more analo-
gous to the Line Item Veto Act, and hence conclude that they too have
violated the Presentment Clause of Article I.
Even here the risk is not great, however, because in most cases the
Court likely will be persuaded to distinguish such delegations from the
Line Item Veto Act as long as it can find a sufficient congressional justi-
fication for the delegation, such that it is willing to characterize the re-
sulting power as the type of authority that the executive properly may
exercise, rather than concluding that Congress has abdicated its legisla-
tive power. For instance, one historical delegation that might seem to be
more vulnerable if reevaluated in light of City of New York is the
authority to impose wage and price controls upheld in 1971 in Amalga-
523. See id. at 447-48; supra notes 494-97 and accompanying text.
524. See American Trucking Assn's, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038-40 (D.C. Cir.
1999); supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text. The delegated authority in American
Trucking is interstitial, predicated upon a variety of statutory standards, and implemented
by an agency with recognized expertise and an accepted history of interpreting its gov-
erning statutes. It therefore does not seem a particularly good candidate for a nondelega-
tion doctrine challenge.
525. See Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, §§ 202-03,
82 Stat. 251, 271-72 (1968); supra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
526. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
77, tit. II, § 252, 99 Stat. 1038, 1072-78 (1985); supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
527. See infra Part V.C.
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mated Meat Cutters."" From one perspective, the unfettered power to de-
termine whether or not to freeze wages or prices involves the exercise of
a fundamentally legislative policy judgment, not the implementation of a
congressional directive. When the President makes this decision, the
President arguably is making the law. Yet from another perspective,
Congress simply cannot make this decision effectively itself, because im-
posing a meaningful price control requires a precise timing of its impact
upon economic conditions, coupled with a certain element of surprise.
The processes of executive implementation are well-suited to impose
such a control effectively, while the deliberative processes of legislation
are ill-suited.5 2 By focusing on these aspects, the Court might well con-
clude that such a power was in essence more interstitial than contingent,
or in any event might insist on evaluating the power under the permissive
"intelligible principle" standard of the nondelegation doctrine, rather
than under the Presentment Clause.
Or, to take another potentially vulnerable recent delegation, consider
the President's authority to suspend indefinitely, six months at a time,
the civil liability provisions of the LIBERTAD Act of 1996.530 The Act
authorized the President to suspend these provisions, which exposed for-
eign firms to lawsuits for the confiscation of American property in Cuba,
if suspension was "necessary to the national interests" and would "expe-
dite transition to democracy in Cuba. 5 31 Yet despite the obvious policy
judgment involved in determining whether to recognize a person's right
to commence a lawsuit, the Court would be likely to continue to treat
such a decision as properly executive, given the Court's ongoing recogni-
tion that in foreign affairs "the President has 'a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved."'532 For the same reason, the Court is
also likely to continue to tolerate delegated authority even permanently
to repeal provisions of trade law, just as it first approved of such delega-
528. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 764 (D.D.C. 1971);
supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
529. See supra notes 403-04.
530. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified in 22 U.S.C. § 6085 (1996)).
531. 22 U.S.C. § 6085(c)(2) (1996). The President exercised this authority repeatedly.
See 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1265-66 (July 22, 1996); 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOG. 3-4 (Jan. 6, 1997); 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1078-79 (July 16, 1997); 34
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 81-82 (Jan. 16, 1998); 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1397-
98 (July 16, 1998); 35 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 63-64 (Jan. 14, 1999).
532. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 445 (1998) (quoting United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649, 691 (1892).
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533tions more than a century ago.
Thus, City of New York may not directly limit Congress' accepted
ability to delegate "sweeping"53 ' degrees of both interstitial and contin-
gent authority, provided Congress can structure its delegations to avoid
the appearance that it is seeking to circumvent the Presentment Clause.
To this end, Congress may want to include, where possible, such features
as making a delegation contingent upon subsequent developments, giv-
ing the delegatee a duty to act in furtherance of a congressional policy,
and allowing the delegatee to reverse course. But even where Congress
omits such features, the Court's lenient nondelegation doctrine prece-
dents may easily continue to provide the mode of analysis for almost any
delegation that the Court is not ready to describe as having caused a
permanent change in the text of enacted laws.
In his concurring opinion in the Benzene case, Justice Rehnquist la-
mented the Court's failure to find the delegation at issue unconstitu-
tional, concluding that the Court had passed up an ideal opportunity "to
reshoulder the burden of ensuring that Congress itself make the critical
policy decisions." '535 Of course, the Court went on to pass up similar op-
portunities in subsequent cases such as Mistretta and Loving. At one
level, the Court finally took up this burden in City of New York, finding
that Congress had not made the critical policy decisions in the Line Item
Veto Act. But in the eyes of those hoping for a reinvigoration of the
nondelegation doctrine, City of New York presumably is an even more
disappointing missed opportunity, precisely because the Court invali-
dated the delegation at issue without relying on the nondelegation doc-
trine. Instead, by retreating from its "new formalism,"536 the Court was
able to rely upon the very premise (namely, that the procedures of Arti-
cle I themselves prohibited unilateral presidential lawmaking) that in
The Steel Seizure Case it had relied upon precisely because the authority
at issue in the seizure case had not been delegated.537 And by avoiding
the issues of the nondelegation doctrine, the decision in City of New
York leaves congressional delegations in general even more secure from
538judicial invalidation. Meanwhile, as next described, most executive
533. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
534. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996).
535. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also id. at 672-75, 685-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
536. Farina, supra note 492, at 181.
537. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1952).
538. At the same time, the doctrine obviously retains its role, highlighted in American
Trucking and acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Mistretta, of "giving narrowing con-
structions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought unconstitutional."
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spending authority may ultimately merit even less nondelegation scru-
tiny.
C. The Potential of Even More Lenient Treatment of Delegations of
Spending Authority
Despite the Supreme Court's invalidation of the Line Item Veto Act's
particular delegation of spending authority, the decision in City of New
York will not necessarily prevent Congress from continuing to give the
President widespread discretion over federal spending. Not only is a
permissive nondelegation doctrine likely to continue to be the standard
by which most executive branch delegations are tested, but also Justice
Scalia's dissent suggests that Congress may give the President still
broader discretion where spending is concerned. Of course, such discre-
tion must not amount to the functional equivalent of an item veto, but
once this hazard has been avoided, Congress may find that it retains tre-
mendous flexibility concerning how it shares its power of the purse with
the executive branch.539
For instance, Justice Scalia expressed "not the slightest doubt" that an
act authorizing the President to decline to spend any item of spending
would be constitutional. ° He predicated this assumption not on an
analysis of the Court's nondelegation doctrine precedents per se, but
rather on the degree of discretionary control over spending that Con-
gress "since the Founding of the Nation" has given to the President,
whether through lump-sum appropriations, discretionary individual ap-
propriations, or explicit authority to withhold or impound funds.54' In
view of this established historical practice, Justice Scalia, joined in this
part of his dissent by Justices O'Connor and Breyer, seemed to suggest
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989).
539. Professor Elizabeth Garrett has suggested that Congress may retain tremendous
flexibility concerning spending whether or not it avoids this hazard, on the basis that the
Line Item Veto Act's authority to cancel dollar amounts of discretionary spending in fact
may have survived City of New York. See Garrett, supra note 21, at 891-92. Her argument
is that because City of New York did not explicitly address this form of cancellation
authority, for which cancellation was defined as to "rescind," see supra note 304 and ac-
companying text, but addressed only the Act's authority to cancel new direct spending and
limited tax benefits, for which cancellation was defined as to prevent from "having legal
force or effect," see supra note 305 and accompanying text, the former authority may re-
main intact. See Garrett, supra note 21, at 873-74, 891-92. Most commentators, however,
and the Justice Department, have concluded that City of New York invalidated the Line
Item Veto Act in its entirety.
540. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 468-69 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
541. Id. at 466-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that a permissible delegation of spending authority would not even re-
quire an intelligible principle. Rather, paralleling the lenient treatment
that the Court in Loving had granted the President's authority over mili-
tary courts, he appeared willing to uphold traditional delegations of
spending authority "without further guidance" from Congress. 42
Although the possibility exists that this view is limited to Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Breyer, it also is possible that other members of
the Court also subscribe to it, despite having voted to strike down the
Line Item Veto Act. As argued above, the Court's invalidation of the
Act may be best explained not as the result of a rigorous analysis of the
cancellation authority itself, but as the product of hostility to the Act's
end-run around the Presentment Clause. If so, a majority of the Court
might be willing to uphold an otherwise similar spending delegation not
encumbered by the offending trappings of an "Item Veto," and might
even be willing to join Justice Scalia in doing so without applying the in-
telligible principle test. For example, even after City of New York, the
Court might be reluctant to conclude that the authority given to Presi-
dent Nixon by the 1969 spending ceilings 3 or the sequestration author-
ity of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,- violated Article I. Although
the Constitution precludes the expenditure of funds without a congres-
sional appropriation 5 it does not mandate that appropriated funds be
spent. Rather, "Congress may confer discretion upon the Executive to
withhold appropriated funds."546 Justice Scalia's analysis suggests not
only the continuing validity of the principle of Cincinnati Soap that
"Congress has wide discretion" to make appropriations "to be allotted
and expended as directed by designated government agencies, 5 47 but
also that, in light of the Executive's historic stewardship over appropri-
ated funds, such delegations generally merit judicial deference regardless
of whether accompanied by an intelligible principle. Although the Line
Item Veto Act was unable to exploit this history successfully, both the
Court and Congress nevertheless may now have sharpened their aware-
ness of this traditional flexibility.
542. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text; see also Transcript of Oral Arg. at
18, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (No. 97-1374).
543. See supra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
544. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
545. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
546. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 46 (1975).
547. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1937).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Despite its determination that in the Line Item Veto Act Congress had
delegated part of its legislative power, the Supreme Court was unwilling
to rely upon the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate the Act. Instead, at
some sacrifice, it settled for the facially appealing yet flawed explanation
that the Act was a circumvention of the lawmaking requirements of the
Presentment Clause, and that the Act violated those requirements just as
much as a true item veto would have. In doing so, the Court passed up a
promising opportunity to demonstrate, for the first time in almost sixty-
five years, that the nondelegation doctrine retains some force as a con-
straint upon congressional grants to the executive of quasi-legislative
powers. Time will tell whether the Court will find an equivalent oppor-
tunity to resuscitate the nondelegation doctrine, but for now the doctrine
continues to appear moribund, and perhaps even less likely to provide
any meaningful constraints upon Congress' ability to delegate to the ex-
ecutive.
City of New York thus is important more for its rationale than for its
result. Because the Supreme Court could have used what it had identi-
fied as significant differences between the Line Item Veto Act and pre-
viously sustained delegations to justify invalidating the Act under the
nondelegation doctrine, its refusal to do so suggests that the current
Court found trouble in reviving the nondelegation doctrine or in sub-
jecting the constitutionality of myriad congressional delegations to
greater judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, the rationale of City of New York
may ultimately make a real difference in the sense that it may heighten
the need for the Court to articulate a more precise definition of Con-
gress' nondelegable lawmaking powers. The Court chose to invalidate
the Line Item Veto Act for violating the Presentment Clause of Article I
because it viewed the Act as delegating precisely such a power. Whether
the Court in the future will similarly strike down particular delegations
for violating Article I, or instead will sustain them under the impotent
nondelegation doctrine, may depend entirely on the label that the Court
chooses to apply to the delegated power.
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